We are building systems that can optimize, scale, automate, and enforce decisions faster than we can realistically recover from their failures.
THAT IS THE GAP.
I kept seeing the same pattern across AI, identity and infrastructure systems.
Most are evaluated for: performance, uptime, compliance, optimization, restoration after failure.
But almost none are evaluated based on a much more important question:
-What happens when recovery itself becomes impossible before intervention can occur?
An AI system can escalate faster than humans can intervene. An identity system can remove access faster than recovery pathways can respond. An infrastructure system can destabilize faster than restoration can contain cascading dependencies.
Different domains.
Same structural problem.
That realization became the basis for:
• Artificial Intelligence Operational Admissibility Framework (AIOAF)
<a href="https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20058191">doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20058…</a>
• Identity, Authentication, and Access Operational Admissibility Framework (IAAOAF)
<a href="https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20060158">doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20060…</a>
• Infrastructure, Energy, and Industrial Operational Admissibility Framework (IEIOAF)
<a href="https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20060412">doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20060…</a>
A public-safe deployment and evaluation bundle is also available for institutional review and interoperability discussion:
<a href="https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20162887">doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20162…</a>
<a href="/OpenAI" title="OpenAI">@OpenAI</a> <a href="/AnthropicAI" title="Anthropic">@AnthropicAI</a> <a href="/GoogleDeepMind" title="Google DeepMind">@GoogleDeepMind</a> <a href="/Aisafetyorg" title="AI Safety Action">@Aisafetyorg</a> <a href="/IEEESpectrum" title="IEEE Spectrum">@IEEESpectrum</a> <a href="/AINowInstitute" title="AI Now Institute">@AINowInstitute</a> <a href="/NIST" title="National Institute of Standards and Technology">@NIST</a> <a href="/CISecurity" title="Center for Internet Security (CIS)">@CISecurity</a> <a href="/SANSInstitute" title="SANS Institute">@SANSInstitute</a> <a href="/okta" title="Okta">@okta</a> <a href="/risj_oxford" title="Reuters Institute">@risj_oxford</a> <a href="/Cloudflare" title="Cloudflare">@Cloudflare</a> <a href="/openid" title="OpenID">@openid</a>
Tweet #5: here are some of the people and entities we will be exposing for what they have done:
GEORGIA TECH
Manos Antonakakis - Associate Professor, Georgia Institute of Technology. Co-Director, COEUS cyber center. Ran active reconnaissance jobs on election networks for DARPA.
Angelos Keromytis - Professor, Georgia Institute of Technology. Co-Director, COEUS cyber center. Discussed whether voting machines were "pinging back" while deployed on Election Day.
DARPA I2O (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency)
Ian Crone - DARPA I2O Program Manager. Approved monitoring of USPS swing-state networks. Confirmed his team was monitoring "actual election networks."
Christopher Schneck - DARPA I2O Contractor. Wrote the directive: "collect a week worth of data from the egress point." Liaison between U.S. Army Cyber and Georgia Tech.
Anna Rubinstein - DARPA I2O Contractor. CC'd on multiple email chains coordinating election network monitoring.
Allison Kline - DARPA. Recipient of the SUNBURST/SolarWinds "opaque targeting" email from Antonakakis, March 2021.
CISA - DHS
Geoffrey Ensley - CISA. Organized the joint DARPA/CISA/MS-ISAC technical coordination call, March 30, 2020.
Ethan Bowen - CISA. On the March 2020 coordination call.
David Howard - CISA. On the March 2020 coordination call.
David Stern - CISA. On the March 2020 coordination call.
Jeffrey Rabinovitz - CISA. On the March 2020 coordination call.
Brian Dewyngaert - CISA. On the March 2020 coordination call.
Jillian Rucker - CISA. On the March 2020 coordination call.
Brandon Seay - CISA. On the March 2020 coordination call.
Annika Shogren - CISA. On the March 2020 coordination call.
Jill Hallgren - CISA contractor AND MS-ISAC. Bridged federal cybersecurity and state election infrastructure monitoring.
MS-ISAC / CISecurity
Marisa Atkinson - MS-ISAC. On the DARPA/CISA/MS-ISAC coordination call. MS-ISAC monitors state and local election networks nationwide.
Matthew Grieco - MS-ISAC. On the coordination call.
Faith Lawless - MS-ISAC. On the coordination call.
U.S. ARMY CYBER - Fort Gordon / CENTCOM
CPT Brian K. Severson - U.S. Army Cyber Protection Brigade, Fort Gordon. Requested the briefing report for CENTCOM network owners. His request triggered the "egress point" directive from DARPA.
CPT Sean K. Eyre - U.S. Army Cyber Protection Brigade, Fort Gordon. CC'd on the egress point email chain.
CPT Antonia L. Feffer - U.S. Army Cyber Protection Brigade, Fort Gordon. CC'd on the egress point email chain.
NEUSTAR / SUNBURST CONNECTION
Rodney Joffe - Senior VP, Neustar. BCC'd on Antonakakis's March 2021 SUNBURST email. Later identified in the Durham Report as providing DNS data to political operatives during the 2016 and 2020 elections. In 2016–2017, Joffe oversaw projects analyzing DNS logs for unusual patterns linking the Trump Organization and Alfa Bank, which were shared with intermediaries like attorney Michael Sussmann for evaluation by the FBI and CIA.
DOMINION VOTING SYSTEMS
Eric Coomer - Former VP of Product Strategy & Security, Dominion Voting Systems. Developer on predecessor Sequoia/WinEDS election software. Admitted under oath that foreign nations had remote access to internal Dominion networks.
See Tweets #1 thru #4 below for the beginning of the story.
The Durham report supposedly listed Joffe as "Tech Executive -1". Rodney Joffe - Senior VP, Neustar: