You do know what he’s done in the past.
Sir Richard Dearlove (correct spelling; full name Sir Richard Billing Dearlove) was the Chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6 or SIS) from 1999 until May 2004.
He held the top role (informally known as “C”) throughout the period leading up to the 2003 Iraq War and the initial invasion/occupation phase.
Key Aspects of His Role
• Intelligence Leadership and the WMD Case: As MI6 chief, Dearlove oversaw the agency’s intelligence gathering and assessments on Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD). MI6 provided key inputs to the UK government’s public dossiers (including the controversial September 2002 “dodgy dossier”), which claimed Saddam Hussein possessed active WMD programs posing a threat. These were central to justifying Britain’s participation in the US-led invasion.
• Downing Street Meetings and US Coordination: In July 2002, Dearlove attended a key Downing Street meeting (detailed in the leaked Downing Street Memo). He reported on discussions in Washington, famously noting that “the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy” regarding regime change in Iraq, with military action seen as inevitable. He was involved in high-level liaison with the CIA (e.g., with Director George Tenet) and briefed on intelligence matters.
• Specific Intelligence Handling: The Chilcot Inquiry (Iraq Inquiry, report published 2016) heavily criticized him for personally pushing “hot” (raw, unverified) intelligence from a source described as having “phenomenal access” directly to Prime Minister Tony Blair. This intelligence suggested active WMD capabilities but was later found unreliable (the source was lying). Chilcot noted that Dearlove’s intervention and urgency gave it undue weight without proper evaluation, influencing ministers’ perceptions.
• Post-Invasion: MI6 under his leadership stood by much of the intelligence even after the invasion, when no significant WMD stockpiles were found. He was also involved in broader post-9/11 counter-terrorism and Afghanistan-related efforts.
Chilcot Inquiry Criticisms
The 2016 Chilcot Report was critical of MI6’s (and Dearlove’s) role, highlighting issues like:
• Over-promising and under-delivering on intelligence.
• Selective sharing of reports.
• Failure to adequately challenge or caveat weak sources.
Dearlove has defended the intelligence community’s efforts in interviews and statements, arguing that the overall picture was not a complete failure and expressing no major regrets about the core decisions, though he acknowledged problems with specific sourcing and presentation.
He retired shortly after the invasion (in 2004) and later became Master of Pembroke College, Cambridge. He has occasionally spoken publicly about these events and considered writing a personal account.
In summary, as MI6 chief, Dearlove was a central figure in providing and presenting the intelligence that supported the UK’s decision to join the Iraq invasion, but his tenure is widely associated with controversies over the accuracy and handling of that intelligence.