this is why we don't decrypt the disk without proof of authenticated user (see: LUKS, FileVault)
if you used systemd-cryptsetup to just unlock with the TPM like bitlocker does, there'd be 50 million bypasses on linux too
but nobody does that, cause that's retarded
I suggest to all jailbroken ps4 players to obtain the perconsole eap hdd key, incase the mainboard is died or whatever reason, can extract the data externally at the linux via cryptsetup then uses ufs2 supported linux kernel.
Copy Fail (CVE-2026-31431) exploits Linux kernel memory management to corrupt binaries in page cache without touching disk, creating a forensic blind spot where traditional file integrity monitoring fails completely.
Key technical details:
• 9-year-old optimization in algif_aead.c allows in-place AEAD operations, but authencesn implementation writes scratch data at offset assoclen cryptlen into chained page cache pages
• Attack path: AF_ALG socket → splice() target binary pages → sendmsg/recvmsg loop to inject shellcode into cached /usr/bin/su → execute for root shell
• Affects kernels 4.14-7.0 (essentially all Linux since 2017), including LTS branches 6.12.x, 6.6.x, 5.15.x, 5.10.x
• In containerized environments, page cache sharing enables container-to-host privilege escalation bypassing all pod security policies
DFIR implications:
• File integrity monitors see clean disk while memory contains corrupted executable
• Standard audit trails show normal su execution with no suspicious file writes
• Syscall-level detection required: monitor AF_ALG SOCK_SEQPACKET socket creation outside disk-encryption tools (cryptsetup, veritysetup)
• Post-incident forensics limited without real-time syscall capture of socket/splice/sendmsg operations
Deploy auditd rules for AF_ALG socket monitoring and Falco detection rules. Page cache corruption is invisible after reboot without preserved memory dumps.
#DFIR_Radar
you can use dm-crypt without header:
cryptsetup open --type plain <flags for all crypto parameters>
Note that this is not really the same as hidden volumes in veracrypt.
Pacotes de segurança KODACHI
ufw - will install
macchanger - will install
firejail - will install
apparmor - already installed
apparmor-utils - will install
apparmor-profiles - will install
aide - will install
lynis - will install
rkhunter - will install
chkrootkit - will install
usbguard - will install
ecryptfs-utils - will install
cryptsetup - will install
cryptsetup-initramfs - will install
cryptsetup-nuke-password - will install
fail2ban - will install
unattended-upgrades - will install
auditd - will install
libpam-pwquality - will install
libpam-google-authenticator - will install
secure-delete - will install
wipe - will install
nwipe - will install
Mira en logs que aparece
sudo journalctl -b -1 | grep -iE 'crypt|luks|cryptsetup|dm-crypt'
Mira a ver si se desbloqueó o como figura. A lo mejor quedó encendido y con algún servicio corriendo.
Je me suis retrouvé dans une boucle infinie où LUKS butait sur une clé TPM non délivrable au lieu de fallback sur la passphrase. Ça m'aura permis de découvrir systemd-cryptsetup...
man7.org/linux/man-pages/man…
once i found it I was left with something like this:
65900000 4c 55 4b 53 ba be 00 01 [...] |LUKS....aes.....|
next step is to set up a loop device from this offset:
sudo losetup -o 0x65900000 -r -f /dev/nvme0n1
and open it: sudo cryptsetup luksOpen /dev/loop1 luksdisk
Il y aura sans doute une option pour un code pin TPM comme c'est déjà le cas sous Windows. C'est déjà intégré et disponible dans cryptsetup depuis des années.