Potentially Increasing conditionality for benefit claimants who have already been assessed as not being able to work, is quite possibly the most ridiculous idea yet. These people cannot access the labour market, and even if they could, there are no available jobs.

The below (attached post) observation that the Iranian regime invoked Imam Husayn’s refusal to pledge allegiance to Yazid while negotiating directly with the United States on the eve of Muharram points to something more than simple inconsistency. It reflects a long-standing pattern in which religious and historical symbolism serves immediate political survival rather than guiding conduct. In mid-February 2026, Ali Khamenei delivered a speech in which he quoted the historic declaration attributed to Husayn: “One like me does not pledge allegiance to one like Yazid,” framing the United States as the embodiment of tyranny. Coordinated American and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear and military targets began in late February 2026 as we all yet remember. Khamenei was killed around 28 February 2026. By mid-June 2026, on the eve of Muharram 1448 AH (which began on or around 16 June), a framework memorandum of understanding had been reached. Iranian state media and the 14-point draft reported by Mehr News outlined an immediate and permanent cessation of hostilities, including in Lebanon (even though its not yet clear if Israel could accept that); the phased lifting of the naval blockade within thirty days; the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz under Iranian regulatory arrangements with permits and fees; the suspension of sanctions on oil and petrochemical exports; and the release of approximately 24 billion USD in frozen assets, with half available before final talks. A sixty-day window was set for narrower nuclear discussions, while ballistic missiles and support for regional proxies were kept off the immediate agenda. In exchange came reconstruction commitments of at least 300 billion USD. The timing placed the accommodation directly against the sacred commemoration of Husayn’s stand at Karbala. The internal shifts that followed are equally precise. Mojtaba Khamenei receded from public view. IRGC-linked figures such as Mohsen Rezaei and Ahmad Vahidi retained central roles alongside Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Ejei, police commander Ahmad-Reza Radan, and parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who had earlier declared negotiations with those responsible for Qasem Soleimani’s death dishonourable but adapted his rhetoric once the new landscape emerged. The IRGC consolidated influence while the clerical establishment was sidelined. Assessments record damage to more than fifty bases, significant IRGC command infrastructure, missile facilities, air defences, and naval units, yet nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan sustained strikes that left approximately 440 kilograms of 60-per cent enriched uranium under regime control and subject to deliberate fortification—tunnel entrances collapsed, backfilled, and mined. These measures were designed to impede any follow-on ground operation. Overland supply routes through Turkey via Kapıköy-Razi to Mersin, Caspian links with Russia, Central Asian corridors, and Pakistan-China pathways remained operational. The regime quickly established the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, imposing tolls that shipping lines accepted under commercial pressure. This sequence echoes the layered record of the Umayyad transition. The treaty between Hasan ibn Ali and Muawiyah was concluded in 41 AH (661 CE), under which Hasan abdicated and received guarantees that included material provisions for Banu Hashim. Hasan died on 7 Safar 49 or 50 AH (5 March 670 CE) from poisoning by his wife Ja’da bint al-Ash’ath, an act many early sources, including accounts transmitted through al-Tabari and others, attribute to instigation by Muawiyah to clear the path for Yazid’s succession. Muawiyah died in Rajab 60 AH (April or May 680 CE), most accounts placing it around 22 Rajab or between 7 and 29 April 680. Yazid succeeded immediately. Husayn refused bay’ah in Medina in early 60 AH (680 CE) and departed Mecca on 8 Dhu al-Hijjah 60 AH (around early September 680). He reached Karbala on 2 Muharram 61 AH and was killed with most of his companions on 10 Muharram 61 AH (10 October 680 CE). In the transmissions, Husayn’s refusal is framed with the very words later quoted by Khamenei: one like him would not give allegiance to one like Yazid. Yazid had appointed Ubayd Allah ibn Ziyad governor of Kufa to suppress opposition, and accounts in al-Tabari record Yazid expressing caution about Husayn’s bloodline and later regret over the manner of the killing while blaming the governor for excess. The parallel lies in the selective use of principle alongside pragmatic power management. In 680, material accommodation under Muawiyah coexisted with political opposition once hereditary succession was announced. In 2026, rhetoric of unyielding resistance framed external confrontation, yet precise military pressure was followed by an accommodation timed to the sacred month, with internal assets preserved and factional influence realigned. The documented damage to command nodes alongside the survival and fortification of core nuclear and IRGC capabilities, the continuity of specific security figures, and the rapid establishment of new revenue mechanisms such as the Strait Authority suggest factional calculation at work: external action that weakened competitors while enabling a negotiated infusion of resources and regulatory leverage for those who endured. The framework therefore delivered time, funds, and reconstitution capacity to the surviving apparatus. Whether rigorous verification, strict conditionality on reconstruction flows, and independent monitoring of diversion pathways will constrain that capacity or merely finance its next iteration remains to be seen in the months ahead. The record of dates and conduct—February rhetoric followed by late-February strikes and leadership loss, then mid-June accommodation on the eve of Muharram, with institutional continuity and supply resilience intact—offers little basis for assuming the former. P.S. One should recall how the CIA has brought up Khomeini and the regime in Iran, and how Khomeini was protected first in Turkey and then in France... Recall all that and follow the money and policies were executed. When the beneficiaries will come to light, then all or some will be easy to understand!

So according to the I paper, Meg Hillier would back new benefit reforms if they included conditionality for young people to engage with employment support programs in order to receive benefits. How does she not realise that this is already a thing? It's called The limited capability for work group. People in this group, although disabled have to do the very thing she is claiming to want to bring in. The only people who currently don't have to do this are the ones who have been assessed as not fit for activity through the rigourous capabilities assessment administered by the DWP. People are already routinely reassessed as well if medical evidence suggests that improvement is likely in the short to medium term future. So the only thing I can think they're going to do would be to reclassify pretty much every young person as being fit for work related activity, although I think this would only be able to apply to new Clements or those existing claimants who are about to undergo reassessment. If they did do this, and I must save it no policy has been formally announced yet, so I am reading between the lines, it would be both dangerous and ridiculous waste of money. It would be dangerous because people would be potentially forced into doing something they simply can't, and it would be ridiculous and a waste of money because, as I've constantly said , changing criteria doesn't change the reality of peoples lives. Somebody who couldn't do something before, can't magically do it because a bureaucrat has decided that they should be able to based on vibes. Anyway, all I can say is I really hope I'm wrong. 

🇺🇸 & 🇮🇷 Peace Deal What is contained in the draft according to reports and leaks (especially Iranian media such as Mehr/IRNA and mediators) The exact final version has not yet been officially released and varies slightly depending on the source (US side emphasizes stronger conditionality and further nuclear demands; Iranian side more guarantees and concessions). Here are the consistently reported core points of the 14-point draft: 1. Immediate and permanent ceasefire on all fronts, including Lebanon. 2. US commitment to non-interference in Iran's internal affairs and respect for the sovereignty of the Islamic Republic. 3. Full lifting of the US naval blockade within 30 days. 4. US troops withdrawal from the immediate vicinity of Iran. 5. Reopening of the road from Hormus within 30 days (duty-free or under Iranian regulations/protocols). 6. Suspension of sanctions on oil, petrochemicals and derivatives full access of Iran to the proceeds. 7. The US and its allies are to present reconstruction programs for Iran worth at least $300 billion. 8. 60-day negotiations for a final agreement (nuclear issues full lifting of primary/secondary US sanctions as well as relevant UN and IAEA resolutions). 9. Iran reaffirms NPT commitment not to develop nuclear weapons. 10. US withdrawal of troop increase in the region and new sanctions during the 60 days. 11. Release of approximately $24 billion in frozen Iranian funds during the 60 days (half of which before the start of the final negotiations). 12. Establishment of a monitoring mechanism for implementation. 13. The final agreement is to be confirmed by a resolution of the UN Security Council. 14. Conditions for the start of the final negotiations: Release of the half-frozen funds lifting of the sea blockade suspension of the oil sanctions. The final agreement is limited to enriched material, enrichment, lifting of sanctions, and economic reconstruction of Iran. Topics such as Iran's missile program or support for "resistance groups" are explicitly removed from the agenda. Additional US-emphasized elements (axes, mediators): Iran never commits to pursuing nuclear weapons; solution of enriched uranium (e.g. down-blending under inspection); sanctions relief performance-based and tied to compliance ("no money until performance"); Trump emphasizes "Strait of Hormuz must remain open, no toll".