1. Our agreement permits inference, broadly, to continue. It only limits AI training above 10^24 FLOP. In Article VIII, we establish that the agreement restricts only research that advances toward ASI or undermines verification. We permit medical diagnostics and drug discovery, for example, among other non-general capabilities. As long as the research focuses on a narrow domain (like materials science or climate modeling) and does not increase "general cognitive capabilities," it is not subject to restrictions.
There is no seizing of assets, but rather mandatory monitoring which can involve forced consolidation of compute into monitored datacenters by the signatory government domestically. (No international centralization of AI monitoring!) So, for example, a small university lab’s research compute would be relocated to a monitored datacenter but is still owned and (remotely) operated by that lab.
2. We architected our agreement to specifically not ban the additional production and installation of compute. The value of such for inference and real-world economic activity is only increasing. So the total economic impact on parts of the AI supply chain are probably far less than existential. We note that many of the relevant players have multi-year backlogs to clear at full production capacity, and building out the infrastructure for model development is only a part of that.
3. Nothing happens to consumer AI apps. If anything additional resources are freed up which can accelerate adoption and integration of these tools.
4. Individual governments handle their own verification and monitoring, but some transparency, random inspections, etc. to either China or the US will be required. Our agreement opts for comprehensive domestic monitoring and shares the least information with rivals (directly) which establishes required confidence. There is no multilateral international AI inspection apparatus in our current version of the agreement, which is a change from the first version we published.
5. Robotics and other applications are unaffected to the extent that progress can continue without developing new models with runs that exceed the compute limit.
6. Our agreement does not attempt to set up a “binding” constraint, in that we do not consider the legal, reputational constraints on US/China to be the active ingredient which leads to stability of the treaty. Instead, we establish a clear understanding on both sides of what behavior is restricted and what consequences must follow otherwise, with enough transparency and non-interference with intelligence gathering to create confidence in each side that the other is adhering to the agreement.
Rather than legal constraints, I consider deterrence as the framework for thinking about the stability of the agreement. This is the historical method for constraining a major power, including the use of strategically significant assets. Nuclear deterrence prevented Soviet employment of its conventional superiority against Western Europe. A Soviet dead hand blocked what was otherwise the possibility of a perfect first strike (nuclear or otherwise). Stability emerges when both sides coordinate to make the consequences of aggression clear. Is that a “binding constraint” that one side “accepts”? No, not legally, textually. Not in the sense of “I staked my reputation and my honor in the arena of international relations”. Where agreements have a role to play is in helping to maintain the conditions for successful deterrence. An example of this is the anti-ballistic missile treaty, in which both sides limited their deployment of missile defenses so that deterrence could be maintained.