Senior Fellow for South & Central Asian Defence Strategy & Diplomacy @IISS_org; RT not endorsement; Views my own; #SouthAsia-#China in #IndoPacific #Nuclear

Joined February 2012
106 Photos and videos
Pinned Tweet
#India-#Pakistan #nuclear #deterrence & #stability are important but rarely urgent. So what for 🇼🇳, đŸ‡”đŸ‡°, us all? ▫Read 👇the new report I wrote and published with my @iiss_org colleagues D. Bowen & J. Gill ▫Read 👉my shorter take bit.ly/3fK7mER bit.ly/3fnBA1f

20 May 2021
There are grave deficiencies and asymmetries in India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear doctrines, which are compounded by mutual disbelief, existing and emerging military capabilities, and the prolonged absence of related dialogue mechanisms. 1/2 | New report: go.iiss.org/3woBkoi
4
19
Antoine Levesques retweeted
đŸ‡«đŸ‡·â˜ąïž La MinArm Ă©claircit la nouvelle doctrine nuclĂ©aire â˜ąïžđŸ‡«đŸ‡· Un long entretien avec Catherine Vautrin vient d'ĂȘtre publiĂ© sur le site du MinistĂšre des ArmĂ©es, uniquement centrĂ© sur la dissuasion. S'il reprend de nombreux points du discours du 2 mars, il en Ă©claircit d'autres qui Ă©tĂ© restĂ©s flous. MĂȘme si la parole de la ministre ne vaut pas celle du prĂ©sident de la RĂ©publique, elle reste l'un des maillons de la chaĂźne dĂ©cisionnelle et est donc lĂ©gitime pour s'exprimer sur le sujet. 1. Les dommages inacceptables "Le niveau de notre arsenal est strictement adaptĂ© pour que nos forces nuclĂ©aires puissent infliger des dommages inacceptables Ă  tout État qui menacerait nos intĂ©rĂȘts vitaux." Cette expression centrale dans la doctrine nuclĂ©aire française avait disparu lors du discours du PR Ă  l'Île Longue pour ĂȘtre remplacĂ©e par : "infliger des dommages dont ils ne se relĂšveraient pas." J'avais essayĂ© de comprendre pourquoi, mais sans justification convaincante. Son retour dans cet entretien publiĂ© sur un site gouvernemental semble donc montrer que le concept de "dommages inacceptables" est toujours en vigueur. 2. La coordination entre adversaires C'est l'une des principales justifications de l'augmentation de notre arsenal nuclĂ©aire, avec notamment la densification des dĂ©fenses antimissiles. Le discours du PR ne mentionnait pas directement dans cette partie du discours les adversaires concernĂ©s, mĂȘme si son introduction faisait la part belle Ă  la Russie, la CorĂ©e du Nord et la Chine. L'entretien de la Minarm explicite dĂ©sormais cette partie importante du discours: "Notre format s’adapte Ă  l’évolution du contexte international et au rapprochement constatĂ© de plusieurs puissances nuclĂ©aires (Russie, CorĂ©e du Nord, Chine)." On s'en doutait, mais c'est toujours bien de le dire. 3. Une dimension europĂ©enne dans son ensemble Le discours du 2 mars faisait explicitement un lien entre le territoire des Etats participant Ă  la dissuasion avancĂ©e et la dissuasion nuclĂ©aire française : "Sa valeur sera, je le crois, trĂšs forte aussi pour les partenaires qui entreront dans cette logique avec nous, et dont le territoire gagnera un lien affirmĂ© avec notre dissuasion." Cela pouvait laisser entendre qu'il y aurait des zones en Europe plus protĂ©gĂ©es que d'autres. Bien que lĂ©gitime, cette approche Ă©tait crainte par plusieurs États car susceptible de crĂ©er des tentations ou mĂȘme des opportunitĂ©s pour la Russie, certains États ne pouvant pour l'instant pas contribuer Ă  la dissuasion avancĂ©e pour diverses raisons. Cette partie du discours fait l'objet d'une clarification par la Minarm: "il ne faudrait pas limiter cette dimension [europĂ©enne des intĂ©rĂȘts vitaux] aux huit partenaires avec lesquels vont se dĂ©velopper des coopĂ©rations dans le cadre de la « dissuasion avancĂ©e »" De quoi rassurer tous nos partenaires europĂ©ens. 4. La dissuasion conventionnelle qui refuse de dire son nom Pendant des dĂ©cennies il Ă©tait quasiment sacrilĂšge de parler de dissuasion conventionnelle en France. Dissuasion = nuclĂ©aire. Pourtant, les Ă©vĂ©nements de ces derniĂšres annĂ©es en Ukraine, en Russie, au Porche et Moyen-Orient ou encore au Cachemir montrent que la dissuasion nuclĂ©aire n'est pas un totem d'immunitĂ©, mĂȘme face Ă  des attaques massives ou Ă  l'invasion d'une partie du territoire d'une puissance nuclĂ©aire. L'intervention du PR Ă  la confĂ©rence de Munich avait dĂ©jĂ  ouvert une brĂšche, en se prononçant pour une approche holistique. Son discours du 2 mars mentionnait Ă©galement la nĂ©cessitĂ© de pouvoir faire face Ă  ce type de menaces: "'n'a-t-on pas vu ces derniers mois des salves de missiles tomber sur des puissances dotĂ©es ou des Etats possesseurs ? L'Europe pourrait un jour se trouver dans une position similaire. Pour gĂ©rer ce genre de situation avant qu'elle ne franchisse le seuil nuclĂ©aire, il faut des capacitĂ©s spĂ©cifiques." La ministre poursuit dans la mĂȘme voie en dĂ©clarant : "Dans un conflit qui se dĂ©roule sous le seuil nuclĂ©aire, nous devons disposer de capacitĂ©s conventionnelles qui offrent des options pour maĂźtriser l’escalade." Pour dissuader un adversaire de nous lancer des volĂ©es de missiles balistiques, il faut pour le menacer de maniĂšre symĂ©trique. D'oĂč l'approche holistique combinant armes conventionnelles et nuclĂ©aires. --- En rĂ©sumĂ© : Cet entretien permet de mieux expliquer certaines parties du discours, sur lequel il reste encore un Ă©norme travail de pĂ©dagogie Ă  faire. En espĂ©rant que d'autres interventions de ce type suivront, par exemple pour expliquer l'absence de la mention explicite de la stricte suffisance ou du ciblage des centres de pouvoir adverses. defense.gouv.fr/actualites/e

1
40
115
11,330
Your pts usefully add to 30May #IISS_SLD26 remarks tinyurl.com/y2rnwyrmby by Lt Gen N Zakaria, Pakistan Army Rocket Force Commander. In Q&A, re AI, he took 'fog of war' pt I had raised, sounding pessimistic re situational awareness and escalation control tinyurl.com/39pmykfu

Replying to @ALevesques
In Subcontinent’s compressed nuclear geography the dynamic is more ambiguous and potentially more dangerous. Partner-enabled ISR density, real-time data fusion, precision integration and multi-domain layering on one side of an asymmetric nuclear flashpoint do reduce traditional uncertainty. But they also compress political-military decision timelines, multiply options under pressure, blur warhead discrimination with dual-capable systems, and can foster overconfidence in escalation dominance or “clean” limited options beneath the nuclear threshold. Recent crises have shown how rapidly margins tighten once high-end capabilities engage. Mutual vulnerability remains the prerequisite for restraint; engineering it away narrows rather than widens stability. External defence-technology partnerships that accelerate one side’s concurrency and operational resilience therefore carry systemic consequences for deterrence geometry in the other theatre. Capability enablement without parallel investment in speed-calibrated crisis guardrails and dispute resolution does not stabilise; it strains. Strategic stability here is managed through credible equilibrium, not assumed through technological density alone. Hope it answers your question 😊
5
500
“Delta almost dissipated Clausewitz’s “fog of war” while keeping in check data oversupply” Omniscience ubiquity is not omnipotence. So, is evidence of, and belief in the shrinking “fog of war” strategically stabilising? Unclear to me in South Asia’s case lemonde.fr/international/art

2
7
370
Antoine Levesques retweeted
6 juin 1944. Une date gravĂ©e dans notre histoire. đŸ•Šïž Il y a 82 ans, la #Normandie devenait le théùtre de l’une des plus grandes opĂ©rations militaires. Parce que la mĂ©moire se transmet, la Normandie continue d’honorer celles et ceux qui ont changĂ© le cours de l’#Histoire. #DDAY
2
46
83
2,510
Antoine Levesques retweeted
India has been cast as the world’s back office for code and customer service. Here's a look inside Modi’s high-stakes push to build AI sovereignty, and the challenges in the way bloomberg.com/news/features/

24
56
263
78,162
Antoine Levesques retweeted
Quantum technologies could become decisive enablers of crisis coordination and secure communication – but only if partners can work together. This analysis examines how Japan, South Korea and the US are pursuing distinctly different quantum pathways, and why the narrowing window to align standards now will shape deterrence and technological influence across the Asia-Pacific. Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2026 | Analysis by Dongyoun Cho, Senior Fellow for Advanced Technologies, National Security and Defence, IISS Find out more: go.iiss.org/4tXyvrJ
1
17
31
7,274
At the @IISS_org Raffles Lecture which took place yesterday in Singapore I asked Hakan Fidan, TĂŒrkiye’s Foreign Minister, about India-TĂŒrkiye relations. His reply 👇 youtube.com/watch?v=I9BsLNhP

1
1
346
Antoine Levesques retweeted
In response to my question on the Quad group, Japan’s Defence Minister Koizumi calls for a meeting among Quad defence ministers, and states that he wants to ‘energise the Quad to the next step’. @IISS_org #IISS_SLD26
2
13
30
3,270
Antoine Levesques retweeted
Two heads of state, 39 government ministers, over 550 delegates, 40 Young Leaders and over 1,500 supporting officials from nearly 80 countries translated into three packed days of defence diplomacy at #IISS_SLD26 | go.iiss.org/SLD26
6
10
2,005
Antoine Levesques retweeted
Following his speech at #IISS_SLD26, United States @SecWar Pete Hegseth fielded a broad range of questions from the audience in an animated question-and-answer session @DeptofWar | Here are a few highlights, you can watch the full session here: go.iiss.org/SLD26
2
12
23
4,229
Antoine Levesques retweeted
The chapters👆were written by my brilliant, leading @IISS_org experts: @R_Schulenburg Jonathan Stevenson @MeiaNouwens @ALevesques @VirajSolanki_ Henry Boyd @dbsalisbury Dongyoun Cho @darshanabaruah @morgmichaels and produced by our wonderful in-house editorial graphics team!
2
2
520
Antoine Levesques retweeted
The IISS is delighted to see the first AUKUS Pillar II Signature Project announced on the sidelines of #IISS_SLD26. By focusing on uncrewed underwater technologies and the protection of critical undersea infrastructure, this initiative shows how advanced capability development can translate strategic partnership into practical deterrence, resilience and maritime security.
AUKUS full steam ahead 🇩đŸ‡ș🇬🇧đŸ‡ș🇾 Today in Singapore, @RichardMarlesMP, @JohnHealey_MP and @PeteHegseth have announced the first AUKUS Pillar II Signature Project. The project will develop systems for Uncrewed Undersea Vehicles – protecting vital national seabed infrastructure.
4
11
35
6,058
Antoine Levesques retweeted
Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh in response to a question from a Vietnamese delegate at the Shangri La Dialogue announced that a deal to sell the Brahmos missile to Vietnam has already been signed, in what is clearly a first public revelation of the sale. Philippines was the first country in South-east Asia to procure the Brahmos. India, he added, is ready to share advance weapons platforms with more friendly foreign countries.
18
146
690
65,323
SCO SG tells #IISS_SLD26 that bilateral ‘issues’ are not discussed, not on agenda, unless there is consensus within. In response to a question on SCO role in 2025 India-Pakistan conflict. No mention of valuable informal connective tissue SCO meetings offer to estranged members.
1
192
ASEAN SG Kao, in answer to my question, says it is in ASEAN’s interest for India and China to get along. Their ongoing engagement is good for the region. #IISS_SLD26
3
4
585
US Secy of War Hegseth referred to the Pacific region rather than the Indo-Pacific, only referring to the Indo part when discussing India’s burden shifting role in the Indian Ocean #IISS_SLD26
8
7
29
9,150
US Secy of War Hegseth says he understands that Pakistan and India may have threat perceptions of each other. The US is not calling out either of the nuclear-armed countries, he adds. #IISS_SLD26
10
15
48
14,963
In his Keynote Address to #IISS_SLD26 Viet Nam’s H.E. Tî Lñm urged powers to address themselves to the age old chicken and egg policy and statecraft challenge of sequencing building “strategic trust” all while creating “rapid communication channels” and “preventative diplomacy”
1
223