🇮🇶 | Iraq: The End of Armed Militias or the Beginning of a Legitimized Parallel Power?
The developments currently unfolding in Iraq are often portrayed as a victory for the U.S. maximum-pressure strategy and a step toward restoring the Iraqi state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Yet a more strategic reading suggests that what is taking place is less a process of disarmament than a reconfiguration of the influence mechanisms employed by Iraq’s Shiite armed groups.
Under the combined pressure of U.S. strikes against Iranian infrastructure, financial constraints imposed on Baghdad, and the scheduled withdrawal of American forces, several armed factions have gradually agreed to reduce their military visibility. Saraya al-Salam, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata’ib al-Imam Ali have all endorsed the principle of placing weapons under state authority.
However, military capabilities do not necessarily disappear. In many cases, they are stockpiled, redistributed, or maintained in less visible forms. At the same time, the militias’ political, economic, and administrative networks continue to expand. The issue is therefore no longer solely one of territorial control through force, but increasingly of controlling resources, strategic infrastructure, and state institutions.
For Washington, the immediate benefits are clear: attacks against American interests have sharply declined, and the military withdrawal can now be presented as the outcome of an effective coercive strategy. Yet this evolution does not necessarily guarantee a lasting reduction in Iranian influence. On the contrary, it may signify its transformation.
For years, Tehran has sought not merely to sustain permanent confrontation but to institutionalise its regional proxies. The experience of Hezbollah in Lebanon has demonstrated that an actor integrated into state structures enjoys far greater political and legal protection than an organisation operating exclusively in the shadows. From this perspective, the gradual integration of Iraqi militias into governance mechanisms appears less as a retreat of Iranian influence than as its consolidation.
The groups involved also appear to be among the primary beneficiaries of this transition. By progressively abandoning their role as overt paramilitary forces, they gain access to more durable sources of power: public contracts, critical infrastructure, land ownership, logistics networks, telecommunications, and customs systems. In other words, the centre of gravity of influence is shifting from the military sphere to the political and economic domains.
At the same time, more hardline organisations, notably Kata’ib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba, continue to reject this trajectory and maintain autonomous military capabilities. This duality should not necessarily be interpreted as fragmentation. It may also represent a form of strategic diversification, allowing Iran to preserve both an institutional lever of influence and a military pressure capability that could be reactivated if necessary.
The silence of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani also contributes to this evolution. In the absence of explicit religious opposition, integrationist factions enjoy considerable room for manoeuvre to legitimise their political repositioning without requiring formal doctrinal endorsement.
Ultimately, the current situation points to a paradoxical equilibrium. The United States reduces the immediate security threat and secures a more favourable environment for its withdrawal. Iran preserves the core of its influence networks while making them less vulnerable to military strikes and sanctions. As for the militias, they are gradually exchanging firepower for more enduring institutional influence.