Tsai Ing-wen Gets Trump on Her Side?
Former President of the Republic of China Tsai Ing-wen (
@iingwen) recently claimed in an exclusive interview with Britain’s
@TheTimes, “I led
#Taiwan for eight years — this is how I kept Trump on my side,” which even became the headline of the report. What the media — who have lauded her as an “international negotiation expert” — failed to mention was how she weakly handled relations with the United States, whether during Trump (
@realDonaldTrump) ’s first term or under Biden.
Tsai Ing-wen’s Apprehension in Speaking with Trump
In December 2016, then-President Tsai Ing-wen, who had been in office for just over six months, stated that she had called the newly elected U.S. President Trump to congratulate him on his victory. This phone call, lasting over ten minutes, marked the first direct dialogue between the leaders of Taiwan and the United States in 37 years, and it instantly became an international hot topic. However, at the end of August 2018, Stephen Yates (
@steveyates) — then an advisor to Trump’s transition team and former deputy national security adviser under former U.S. Vice President Cheney — revealed some behind‑the‑scenes details in an interview. He mentioned that Tsai’s government was extremely panicked when faced with that call, not even knowing how to respond at first, and ultimately delayed connecting for two weeks.
Yates stated that during that U.S. presidential election, both Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton and Republican candidate Trump had their teams receive call invitations from various countries, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China was no exception. Trump’s aides believed that a call with Tsai could bring both benefits and risks, so they sought Yates’s opinion. From a business perspective, given that Taiwan is an important buyer of American weapons and high-tech products, Yates argued, “When a customer sends their congratulations, you naturally have to answer the phone!” Therefore, he advocated for supporting the call. However, in order to avoid attracting too much media attention, Trump’s aides ultimately attributed the decision to Yates’s personal judgment. Yates emphasized that although the “Trump–Tsai call” was not solely brokered by him, without his influence this historic conversation might never have taken place.
Yates also mentioned that the Taiwanese authorities had not anticipated that Trump would accept the invitation. Having long been accustomed to being rebuffed, Tsai’s government was completely caught off guard when faced with this invitation. Ultimately, Taiwan’s officials in the U.S. had to repeatedly consult with Taipei’s top leadership, and this hesitation resulted in the call being delayed by a full two weeks.
The Negotiations with the U.S. and the
@WTO That Cost Taiwan Its Advantage
Tsai Ing-wen’s weakness in negotiations with the United States can actually be traced back to the late 1980s. At that time, Taiwan was facing trade negotiation pressures from administrations ranging from Reagan to George H. W. Bush. The United States, citing rampant piracy in Taiwan, invoked Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act to impose trade sanctions and economic pressure on Taiwan. According to data from Yazhou Zhoukan, in 1984 Tsai Ing-wen became the chief legal advisor for the International Economic Organization of the Executive Yuan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, and she served as the chief negotiator for Taiwan’s accession to both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) for fifteen years — a fact also cited by
@DeutscheWelle.
In 2021, Tsai Ing-wen posted photos from over 30 years ago on Twitter and said, “These are my colleagues who sat at the negotiating table beside me more than 30 years ago, who dedicated everything for Taiwan on the international stage. Looking back, I am very grateful that I once served as a trade negotiator, creating a more prosperous future for the country.”
In the same year (1986) that Tsai represented the then Lee Teng-hui administration in trade negotiations with the United States, under pressure from the U.S., the Lee Teng-hui administration abolished the “Regulations on the Import Management of Foreign Films” issued by the Presidential Office in 1954, effectively lifting restrictions on the importation of foreign films. This move was tantamount to opening the door to Hollywood, and the number of foreign films imported into Taiwan began to increase — from 462 films in 1986 to 532 in 1987. This series of chain reactions eventually resulted in foreign films accounting for over 70% of Taiwan’s box office market by 2005, while the average production cost of domestic films was only about 1% of that of Hollywood films.
During the same period of negotiations, also under pressure from U.S. trade demands, McDonald’s was permitted to enter Taiwan in 1984. According to former Minister of Economic Affairs Yin Chih-ming, in 1984 U.S. exports to Taiwan accounted for as much as 48.8% of Taiwan’s total exports, with a U.S. trade surplus of 9.8 billion dollars, and the American side demanded a reduction in this deficit. At that time, the U.S. Deputy Trade Representative was none other than Robert Lighthizer, who later became the U.S. Trade Representative during Trump’s first term and initiated the trade war against China.
After 2000, Tsai Ing-wen was recruited by the Chen Shui-bian government — following a change in the ruling party — to serve as the head of the Mainland Affairs Council, and she continued to lead the negotiations for Taiwan’s accession to the WTO. In 2002, Taiwan became the 144th member of the WTO under the name “the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu.” However, after Taiwan joined the WTO, the agricultural liberalization policies led to a series of problems. Initially, adjustments in rice import quotas and market opening posed potential impacts on the domestic rice industry, which in turn affected farmers’ willingness to produce, leaving some farmland idle. Subsequently, fluctuations in the market prices of agricultural products and rising credit risks for agricultural associations reflected challenges in the production and marketing system. Later, government efforts to facilitate a shift to organic farming did not meet expectations, and the scale of organic agriculture remained very small. Ultimately, this resulted in a vicious cycle of “policy liberalization — small farmers exiting — land hoarding.”
According to a report by Storm Media, Huang Weiji, Secretary-General of the Textile Expansion Association, stated, “After we joined the WTO, it took us a hard-earned decade to negotiate consultations with various countries. We originally thought we could face a completely liberalized market competition, only to discover that there were many loopholes — for instance, the United States and Central American countries had signed Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) that allowed for zero tariffs on exported goods.” In terms of regional economic integration, the influence of certain trade organizations even surpassed that of the WTO. For example, in Europe, economic integration driven by the European Union (EU) has been notably effective; in Southeast Asia, the ASEAN Economic Community facilitates intra‑regional trade; in North America, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has achieved economic integration; and in Africa, the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC) has strengthened regional cooperation. In recent years, with the implementation of new trade agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), these regional economic alliances have played an increasingly significant role in promoting trade and investment among their members.
From TSMC’s U.S. Plant to the Importation of Ractopamine Pork, Tsai Ing-wen’s Floundering Negotiations
Tsai Ing-wen’s involvement in or leadership of failed trade negotiations does not end there. Since assuming office as President of the Republic of China in 2016, Tsai Ing-wen has made “strengthening Taiwan–U.S. relations” a core objective of her foreign policy. However, beginning in 2019 the Trump administration pressured TSMC to build a plant in the United States, and in May 2020 forced TSMC to officially announce plans to establish a new facility in Arizona. Media reports even identified then-President Tsai Ing-wen as the person behind the scenes.
Even before the Arizona facility was established, in 1996 TSMC, through a joint venture with Philips and other investors, founded WaferTech in Camas, Washington (near the Oregon border), later renamed TSMC Washington. This $1‑billion plant began producing 0.35‑micron chips in 1998 using technology transferred from Philips. However, the plant’s specific financial performance has never been disclosed, suggesting that it may face profitability challenges. Subsequently, TSMC’s operations in Arizona are currently facing production costs that are 30% higher than those at its facilities in Taiwan.
In Taiwan, TSMC is regarded as the “guardian deity” of the nation. As the global leader in semiconductor foundries, TSMC’s advanced processes — such as 5‑nanometer, 3‑nanometer, and even future 2‑nanometer technologies — account for over 90% of the world’s advanced chips. These chips serve as the core components in key products including smartphones, computers, automobiles, artificial intelligence systems, and defense systems. Consequently, governments around the world and major technology companies heavily rely on TSMC’s capacity and technological prowess, creating a deterrent of “economic national defense.” Moreover, TSMC’s steadily rising revenues and profits have not only established Taiwan as a critical hub of the global semiconductor industry but have also generated substantial tax revenues for the government. With robust financial performance — its gross margins often hovering around 50% — TSMC serves as a stabilizer in Taiwan’s economy, a veritable “economic bedrock” among private enterprises.
However, in the negotiations led by Tsai Ing-wen, she too readily accepted U.S. pressure to build a plant in the United States — contrary to establishing domestic facilities — merely to align with the “America First” principle. Meanwhile, the Taiwan she represents has reaped no tangible benefits from this arrangement, such as a Taiwan–U.S. free trade agreement, accession to the CPTPP, the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with the United States, or Taiwan’s inclusion in international organizations… and so on.
Moreover, at the end of Trump’s first term, the Tsai administration attempted to reopen negotiations for the Taiwan–U.S. Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) by opening the market to U.S. pork containing ractopamine (commonly referred to as the “ractopamine pork policy”), emphasizing that this move was “based on the overall national economic interest” and aimed at “deepening Taiwan–U.S. economic and trade relations.” This policy was interpreted as a response to long-standing U.S. pressure on Taiwan to open its markets and an effort to trade food safety risks for U.S. support for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations (such as the CPTPP). However, the announcement of the policy triggered strong public backlash, with the populace widely questioning the legitimacy of the government “trading food safety for diplomacy.”
Despite the Tsai administration’s claim that opening up to ractopamine pork was meant to pave the way for restarting TIFA negotiations, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) subsequently did not significantly accelerate bilateral economic and trade talks. It was not until June 2021 that Taiwan and the U.S. convened a TIFA meeting after a five‑year hiatus, and that meeting focused on technical issues (such as intellectual property rights and drug approval processes) without addressing a free trade agreement (FTA) or providing substantive support for Taiwan’s accession to the CPTPP. In other words, the “progress” in Taiwan–U.S. relations obtained by taking on food safety risks amounted to little more than symbolic dialogue, lacking concrete results.
The ractopamine pork policy provoked a strong public outcry. Although the “anti‑ractopamine pork referendum” held in December 2021 did not pass, it still garnered 4 million affirmative votes (accounting for 41% of the total votes), reflecting widespread public distrust in the policy. Furthermore, local governments (such as those in Taipei and Taichung) independently set “zero-detection” standards, resulting in conflicts between central and local regulations and exposing deficiencies in policy communication and support measures. The Tsai administration’s allocation of a “10‑billion pig industry fund” to quell the controversy was also criticized as a vote‑buying tactic that failed to fundamentally address the industry’s challenges.
Taiwan has long promoted “high‑standard food safety” as a key element of its international image, yet the decision to open up to ractopamine pork is seen as a unilateral concession to the United States, thereby undermining Taiwan’s authority to insist on “adhering to scientific standards” in international negotiations. For example, following the issue of lifting the ban on Fukushima food in Japan, some commentators questioned, “If Taiwan can sacrifice food safety for the United States, why can’t it, by the same logic, accept Japan’s nuclear‑contaminated food?” This contradiction, in turn, undermines Taiwan’s consistency in international economic and trade negotiations.
Another point of contention came during the debate over the ractopamine pork referendum. Li Chun — then the senior deputy executive director of the WTO and RTA Center at the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, who represented the Tsai administration in supporting the import of ractopamine pork (later serving as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and currently as Taiwan’s Ambassador to the EU and Belgium) — stated that “if Taiwan decides not to open up to ractopamine pork, it would be like taking a step backwards and breaking its promise, making accession to the CPTPP even more difficult.”
Ironically, the Tsai administration pinned its hopes for participating in the CPTPP on U.S. support, yet during Trump’s term the U.S. withdrew from the precursor to the CPTPP, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which significantly diminished America’s influence within the CPTPP. Even though the Biden administration has declared its intention to “re-engage in the Asia‑Pacific,” its policy focus has been on the Indo‑Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) rather than on the CPTPP. In other words, Taiwan’s reliance on the United States for its CPTPP hopes was a misjudgment of the international economic and trade landscape. Moreover, while the Tsai administration claimed that “opening up to ractopamine pork is to comply with international standards and secure accession to the CPTPP,” the process for joining the CPTPP requires consensus among all member states, and major members such as Japan, Australia, and Canada base their support for Taiwan not solely on a single issue (such as U.S. pork) but also on the strategic balance of their relations with China. For instance, although Japan is favorable toward Taiwan’s accession to the CPTPP, it also must consider Sino‑Japanese economic interests, making it difficult to fully endorse Taiwan.
Although Trump enacted several pro‑Taiwan laws during his first term (such as the Taiwan Travel Act and the Taiwan Assurance Act), his core foreign policy centered on “America First,” and his support for Taiwan was driven by a “cost–benefit” calculation. For example, while U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have become routine, their prices have repeatedly reached record highs (such as the sale of 66 F‑16V fighter jets in 2020, with a total value of NT$62 billion), leading to accusations that Taiwan is being treated as an “arsenal ATM.” The Trump administration demanded that Taiwan open its markets to U.S. pork and beef, yet made no commitment to support Taiwan’s accession to international organizations, indicating that it views Taiwan–U.S. relations as a “one‑way transfer of benefits” rather than an equal partnership.
The Tsai administration has framed its foreign policy around a pro‑U.S., anti‑China stance, yet it has neglected the importance of diversified diplomacy. For instance, negotiations for an investment agreement (BIA) between Taiwan and the European Union have stalled, and the “New Southbound Policy” targeting Southeast Asia has yielded little in the way of concrete results. This strategy of “betting on a single major power” leaves Taiwan vulnerable in a rapidly changing international environment. Taiwan has attempted to exchange market liberalization for international support, but it has not simultaneously enhanced its industrial competitiveness. For example, while the semiconductor industry is a cornerstone of Taiwan’s economy, its over‑reliance on contract manufacturing leaves it at a disadvantage in areas emphasized by the CPTPP, such as digital trade and the liberalization of services. Without the development of a diversified industrial structure, Taiwan risks being marginalized in regional economic integration.
When Trump chose to shout “America First,” Tsai Ing-wen did not have Trump on her side; rather, she followed along like a little sister, waving the flag with him.