The prolonged conflict in Iran has left the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz unresolved. The fundamental differences among the United States, Israel, and Iran remain as wide as ever, with no viable exit strategy in sight to mitigate mutual losses.
This protracted war has led to severe disruptions in the supply of Qatari 6N-grade helium and Middle Eastern crude oil. Currently, for South Korea and Taiwan, the United States stands as the sole alternative to replace their Middle Eastern supply routes. Looking at the strategic reserves of 6N-grade helium and crude oil in both nations, if the war continues until the end of the year, they will be forced into absolute dependence on the US.
However, most retail investors are only superficially aware that the current return on AI investments is abysmal and that the private equity market—the primary funding source for AI—is in dire straits. But what if the warnings from financial titans about an AI bubble burst actually materialize? What happens if private credit, the lifeline of AI ventures, freezes, multiple US states cancel their AI data center projects, and semiconductor manufacturers are forced to declare force majeure?
Let's first examine the stance of the US administration. Earlier this year, the US President and the Secretary of Commerce threatened to impose tariffs on semiconductors from South Korea and Taiwan to pressure them into investing in the US. Although this pressure was short-lived—as it was highly detrimental to Big Tech, the core of the US market—and seemed like a hasty measure, it was actually a desperate move to counter the geopolitical risks associated with semiconductor chips, as profoundly analyzed by US scholars like Chris Miller. Ultimately, the US has no choice but to maintain this stance toward South Korea and Taiwan until it secures its own domestic semiconductor manufacturing capabilities.
Now, let's connect the dots. The prolonged Iranian war is rapidly depleting Northeast Asia's reserves of 6N-grade helium, essential for semiconductor manufacturing, and crude oil, which underpins their entire national industries and economies. Notably, as analyzed by the Oregon Group in their article "Helium crisis puts US in control of semiconductor supply chain", Northeast Asia will inevitably face a helium shortage by the end of the year. As for crude oil reserves, South Korea ostensibly has about 200 days' worth, but considering the shares allocated for petrochemical exports, practical analyses suggest it is closer to 68 days (at most 90 days).
In this context, suppose the private equity market stiffens, drying up AI investment funds, and more US states begin rejecting AI data centers due to water, environmental, and electricity concerns. A cascading cancellation of AI data center plans would spell the end of the semiconductor supercycle.
At that pivot point, the power dynamic will reverse: South Korea and Taiwan will lose their leverage as indispensable suppliers, and the US will assert its dominance as the absolute dictating power. The US will then execute its grand strategy for semiconductor security, meticulously drafted by its top scholars.
South Korea's entire industrial spectrum—not just semiconductors, but also renewables, secondary batteries, and EVs—survives heavily on the US market, which has erected high trade barriers against China. Conversely, China represents an absolute threat to South Korea's emerging industries. As for Taiwan, while there is some public sentiment favoring eased economic tensions with China, the aftermath of the Hong Kong protests has left them highly vigilant against the prospect of annexation by a dictatorial regime. In essence, South Korea and Taiwan cannot escape the sphere of American hegemony.
What, then, is the fate of the South Korean and Taiwanese markets? Their profit margins, historically bolstered by relatively cheaper labor and material costs compared to the US, will vanish. South Korean memory chipmakers, in particular, will suffer a significant loss of competitiveness against US-based Micron.
Moreover, the booming semiconductor industry that previously supported local materials, parts, and equipment (MPE) suppliers in both nations will face cascading issues. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) excluded from CHIPS Act subsidies lack the capital to relocate their factories to the US. Supplying goods across the Pacific incurs prohibitive logistics costs. Consequently, parts of the supply chain will be replaced by domestic US MPE companies; even if not fully replaced, the chipmakers' profit margins will suffer further damage.
This sequence of events will trigger a hollowing out (deindustrialization) of the South Korean and Taiwanese markets long before hyperscalers can secure new funding to resume AI data center projects. For the AI sector to recover from a bubble burst, tech companies must demonstrate renewed productivity, much like they did after the dot-com bubble. However, while the CHIPS Act provides upfront subsidies for US investments, it also demands a substantial share of operating profits. Furthermore, under the pretext of preventing technology leaks to China, the core technological processes of semiconductor companies will be subject to meticulous US audits.
Ultimately, capital is drained from their home countries to the US through labor costs, taxes, and the CHIPS Act, while their proprietary technology remains highly vulnerable. TSMC founder Morris Chang accurately predicted this exact hollowing-out scenario.
[Conclusion]
The US grand strategy for semiconductor security, built upon rigorous scholarly analysis, will persist until it achieves its objectives. Bound to American hegemony militarily, economically, and diplomatically, South Korea and Taiwan—cornered by raw material shortages—will be forced to renegotiate their semiconductor deals with the US from a position of severe disadvantage. Should the US execute its plan successfully, the hollowing out of the South Korean and Taiwanese markets is virtually inevitable.