Courts w/t enforcement pwr don’t monitor every decis'n; they intervene when pub pressure threatens their rep'n. Using 6,000 cases from the Const'l Court of Ecuador, authors show civ society signals drive jud'l oversight, revealing compliance is shaped more by pressure than pwr.

This article examines whether opposition silence on anti-LGBTQI legislation helps liberal challengers avoid electoral penalties. It shows that avoidance strategies don’t boost electoral support & erode perceptions of moral leadership while weakening support for LGBTQI rights.

Pub. consultation should make constitutions more democratic, but what if elites interpret input to confirm their choices? Using interviews in Chile and Cuba, Martin introduces “will-confirmation”—how participation becomes elite legitimation rather than a check on interpretation.

Why do some hard-fought social movement policy wins endure while others fade? Evidence from 17 mining conflicts in Ecuador and Peru shows that durability hinges on mobilization after policy adoption, esp by pushing inside the state and securing decisions at the highest levels.

When do corrupt incumbents agree to indep. international anti-corruption commissions? This article finds that gov't insiders and civil society orgs can work together and leverage their agenda-setting power & expertise to ensure the autonomy of hybrid anti-corruption initiatives.

Why would cash-transfer beneficiaries reduce support for these programs when poverty grows? Drawing on evidence from Argentina, this Ayelén Vanegas shows that when recipients perceive transfers as ineffective, they shift toward supporting longer-term social investment policies.

This article examines long-term effects of authoritarian violence on outgroup intolerance in Indonesia. Findings highlight historical legacies of state-led ethnic violence under dictatorship as a source of political intolerance in present-day democratic societies.

When do industrial workers protest in an autocracy? This article argues that emotional contagion explains a short-term spike in labor mobilization against the regime.