I respect Asher’s analysis in the quoted tweet and the time he took to look into this, but I believe that what this chart shows is just that we are in the miner-capitulation phase of the cycle.
Although it’s a subtle point, one shortcoming of the chart and its analysis is the assumption that the U.S. dollar, as the unit of measure for miner revenue, is globally determinative.
Not all miners track mining revenue in USD. In some countries, local fiat currencies experience inflation far faster than the dollar, which means that KAS mining revenue denominated in those currencies has dropped by less than this chart suggests.
For instance, in Venezuela, the price of KAS in local currency is higher now than when the Kaspa network’s hashrate was at its peak, indicating that the chart may not accurately reflect miner incentivization there. While I’m not asserting that mining KAS in Venezuela is more profitable, I am highlighting the problem with assuming USD-denominated revenue is globally determinative of mining incentivization.
Mining will increase if KAS is increasingly used as money, because mining is the mechanism by which energy is converted into money within the Kaspa economy. Therefore, if Kaspa’s use as money continues to grow, as rising inactive supply clearly indicates, mining and hashrate will tend to rise as well.
Relatedly, I am working on a report that attempts to quantify the extent to which exchanges are suppressing Kaspa’s fiat price. It is important to understand that mining incentives are being artificially held down at the moment, and this is not due to any design defect of Kaspa.
In effect, this suppressive action by exchanges “steals energy” from miners and distributes it, in its converted form, to market buyers of KAS. Exchanges are therefore subsidizing the cost of KAS for buyers at the expense of miner profitability. The good news for Kaspa’s security is that such suppression can only ever be temporary, as a supply shock will eventually disrupt it.
From a theoretical standpoint, exchanges suppressing Kaspa’s price are behaving as inefficient economic actors. Over time, market forces will eliminate these inefficiencies, and the suppression will necessarily end. A time will likely come when some of the same actors currently pushing Kaspa’s price downward will, after accumulating enough KAS, attempt to drive price upward — and when that happens, the incentive to mine will return with full force.
We are currently in the phase of the cycle where both the coin and mining are “cold.” Once the coin “heats up” again (price rises), hashrate will follow on a lagging basis. We can be reasonably certain that the price of KAS will rise by looking at multiple metrics: inactive supply continues to increase (i.e., KAS is increasingly being used as a store of value), transactional volume is generally trending upward, and basic supply-and-demand dynamics support higher prices.
Kaspa’s supply is completely inelastic and new supply falls rapidly, so when demand rises (or even if it merely stays constant or decreases more slowly than new supply) price will move higher.
With that said, we already know real demand for Kaspa is extremely high; see my recent post analyzing the KAS accumulation of Kaspa’s largest address (
x.com/KaspaReport/status/199…). A supply shock will eventually occur, and Kaspa’s price against fiat currency will likely rise sharply, marking the beginning of a new bull cycle and a renewed rush to mine.
Kaspa’s hashrate won’t just reach new all-time highs; it will tend to increase faster than Bitcoin’s over time. Kaspa’s much higher block creation rate reduces mining reward variance and improves the efficiency with which miners convert energy into its stored monetary form, KAS. This, along with block parallelism / the avoidance of stale blocks, makes mining KAS more attractive than mining BTC and, over the long term, will cause the Bitcoin network to leak hashrate to Kaspa. In essence, because Kaspa is a better distributed ledger and a superior commodity money, Kaspa’s hashrate will tend to rise faster over time.
Since 2024, the scarcity effects of Bitcoin’s halving made BTC temporarily more valuable relative to KAS. As that effect fades, and because Kaspa’s stock-to-flow ratio rises much more rapidly than Bitcoin’s, the pendulum will swing strongly back toward Kaspa, and KAS will become more valuable when measured in Bitcoin terms. When Kaspa becomes more valuable relative to Bitcoin, Bitcoin miners will tend to switch to mining Kaspa.
As Kaspa surges in value against Bitcoin, Bitcoin miners perceive an opportunity to mine KAS and convert it into BTC for an excess return compared with mining BTC directly, which causes Kaspa’s hashrate to grow faster than Bitcoin’s.
This excess return can also be understood as KAS being more energy-efficient to mine than Bitcoin, which ties back to Kaspa’s lower reward variance and absence of stale or orphaned blocks. This is precisely what MARA’s CEO recognized when the company chose to begin mining KAS.
Again, I respect Asher’s analysis and the time he took to review the data, but it is flawed because it assumes USD-denominated revenue is globally determinative for mining incentivization. There are also confounding factors, such as temporary CEX price suppression, that the chart and its analysis do not capture.
The important question is whether Kaspa’s use as money is intact and growing; if it is, then the incentive to mine will remain intact and grow as well.
Kaspa is unstoppable, and the world has barely begun to grasp the scale of the disruption it will cause.