So nothing about Iran supporting terrorists who send suicide bombers to Israel, similar to what Pakistan is doing to India. Why would Israel support Iran, when more wealth means more money to Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthis?
For Israel, the Iranian issue has never been only about the nuclear programme. It has also been about the emergence of a large, populous, resource-rich, technologically capable regional rival at the centre of the Middle East.
Iran possesses attributes that no other regional state quite combines: A population of around 90 million.
A highly educated scientific and technical base.
Significant industrial capacity.
Vast oil and gas reserves.
Strategic geography linking the Gulf, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Indian Ocean.
A deep civilisational identity and state tradition.
Even after decades of sanctions, war, and isolation, Iran has remained consequential.
The counterfactual is striking.
Had Iran not spent much of the last four decades under sanctions and geopolitical pressure, it might today resemble something closer to Turkey on a much larger scale, or perhaps even a Middle Eastern equivalent of a G20 power.
That is why many Israelis have long believed that sanctions were not simply a tool to constrain nuclear ambitions. They were also a means of limiting the emergence of a powerful regional competitor.
Now imagine a different future.
If sanctions are eased, oil exports resume, frozen assets are released, shipping normalises through Hormuz, and foreign investment gradually returns, Iran could regain significant economic momentum. Recent reporting suggests that any emerging US-Iran understanding may include substantial sanctions relief, particularly on oil exports and associated financial services.
For Israel, that prospect is strategically uncomfortable. Which explains the meltdown in Jerusalem.
For India, however, the calculus is different. India has never viewed Iran as a threat.
A stronger Iran does not automatically diminish India’s position.
Indeed, a reintegrated Iran could create opportunities for Indian trade, connectivity, energy security, and regional diplomacy.
That does not mean India would welcome an Iranian nuclear weapon or regional destabilisation. It would not.
But India has no structural interest in keeping Iran permanently weak. This is perhaps where Indian and Israeli interests diverge most clearly.
Israel’s ideal outcome has often been a non-nuclear, economically constrained Iran.
India’s ideal outcome is a non-nuclear, stable, economically integrated Iran.
Those are not the same thing.