Coisas de Deus🙌 Bom dia!

She’s seriously incredible.🤩

O Observatório da Oposição 128 escancara o método de censura e aparelhamento do governo Lula: tenta controlar as redes às vésperas da eleição, usa bilhões públicos para comprar apoio político e expõe a Polícia Federal para blindar Lulinha quando investigações se aprofundam sobre o roubo no INSS. Esse é o lulopetismo, que usa o Estado para se perpetuar no poder enquanto o povo paga a conta com censura, inflação, dívida e insegurança! 🔗 Leia e compartilhe a 128ª edição (bit.ly/4dyPL1N) e as demais (bit.ly/4ly0sSI) do Observatório da Oposição.

Quebrou o pau: Chinês e Baiano se desentendem na fábrica da BYD em Camaçari na Bahia.

Crianças abandonadas no interior da China🇨🇳

Reação de moça chama atenção ao ir comprar bonecas e perceber que até elas passaram por “harmonização” e “lipo”. 😂

That head tilt when Pavarotti hit the high note was the cutest thing ever. 🎤💕🐶 #Pavarotti #OperaMagic #HighNotes #ClassicMusic

Mergulho de onça-pintada é assim: elegante, poderoso e absurdamente fofo! 🐯💦 Refrescando o dia no Instituto Onça-Pintada. Que vida boa!

Brazil is letting China buy its future at a discount. Chinese M&A in Brazil hit an eight-year high in H1 2025 ($1.7 billion). Lula visited Beijing in May and came home with $4.5 billion in commitments. Envision: $1 billion. Great Wall Motors: $1.05 billion. CGN Power: $529 million. Longsys: $423 million. Sounds like a win. Look closer. China State Grid has invested more than $12 billion in Brazil and manages $25 billion in assets across 14 of 27 states. It owns CPFL Energia, one of the largest power distributors in São Paulo state. It built and operates the Belo Monte ultra-high-voltage transmission line (2,539 km, serving 22 million Brazilians). It just won the largest power transmission concession in Brazilian history ($3.6 billion, 1,513 km in the Northeast). A foreign state-owned enterprise controlled by the Chinese Communist Party has operational control over critical electricity infrastructure serving tens of millions of Brazilians. COFCO (Chinese state grain trader) is now one of the largest grain traders operating in Brazilian ports, competing directly with Cargill, Bunge, and ADM. Brazilian soybeans increasingly move through a supply chain where Beijing sets the terms. BYD opened its largest overseas factory in Camaçari, Bahia. Sales grew 327% in 2024. Brazilian automakers can't compete on price. The Chinese factories employ Chinese supply chains, import Chinese components, and send profits to Shenzhen. Serra Verde (Brazil's only rare earth mine) exports concentrate. The only realistic destination today: Chinese refineries. Beijing processes 90% of the world's rare earths and 99% of the heavy elements that make EV motors and missile systems work. Brazil mines it. China refines it. China captures 5-20x the margin. Brazil gets the hole in the ground. This is the pattern. Every time. China doesn't transfer technology. It transfers dependency. It builds infrastructure that requires Chinese maintenance, Chinese equipment, Chinese software, and Chinese supply chains. When the equipment breaks, you call Beijing. When the software needs updating, you call Beijing. When the contract comes up for renewal, Beijing sets the price. The United States is a different partner. Not a perfect one. But a fundamentally different one. The DFC's $465 million for Serra Verde funds processing upgrades and requires a portion of production be made available to the United States. American capital comes with conditions that build capacity, not just extract output. American capital markets (NYSE, NASDAQ) gave Nubank a $45 billion IPO. Embraer lists ADRs. WEG trades globally. Chinese capital markets offer none of this to Brazilian companies. American universities train thousands of Brazilian students every year. The BrazilCham fellowship program sends young Brazilian professionals to US graduate schools. This human capital returns to Brazil. Chinese scholarships create dependency on Chinese institutions. The US committed $565 million to Brazilian critical minerals. Lula's non-negotiable condition for any bilateral deal: processing and refining happen on Brazilian soil. China invested billions. The structural outcome: processing happens in China. Serra Verde's concentrate has one realistic destination today... Chinese refineries. From 2023 to 2024, Chinese FDI in Brazil grew 113% to $4.8 billion. American FDI in Brazil grew 0.057%. Brazil holds 94% of global niobium. Second-largest reserves of rare earths and graphite. 50% of the territory unmapped. This is generational wealth if developed with partners who build Brazilian capacity. It is generational dependency if developed with partners who extract Brazilian resources and process them elsewhere. The question isn't whether Brazil should accept foreign investment. The question is which foreign investment builds a sovereign industrial economy and which one builds a colony with better infrastructure. Brazil has been a colony before. It didn't end well. Read more about the Race for Brazil between the U.S. and China: x.com/drewcrawford_/status/2…

Como o Brasil entregou a Amazônia para países estrangeiros Segue 🧶 (1 de 4) Em março de 1992, às vésperas da Rio-92, o secretário do Meio Ambiente José Lutzenberger denunciou: o IBAMA tinha virado “uma sucursal 100% das madeireiras”. Ele afirmou que interesses externos-multinacionais, Banco Mundial e megaprojetos como o Polonoroeste — estavam destruindo a floresta com a cumplicidade do próprio governo brasileiro. Lutzenberger queria uma comissão independente para investigar, mas foi demitido dias depois.