The ongoing 🇮🇷-🇮🇱 fire exchange is kept limited by both sides for now Iran never committed its missile forces to a scale that would enable its 'Airpower Suppression' concept to full effect Instead it went for a minimalist but highly efficient and effective attrition operation mode. The 'Airpower Suppression' concept would target a weak link in Israel's airpower, such as the support aircraft section at Nevatim airbase (tankers, jammers, airborne-radar) An area target, several kilometers large, but not well hardened. With plenty of soft, mission-critical assets like maintenance hangars Then over the timespan of e.g. 10 days, every ~5 hours one Khorramshahr-4 with submunition payload, or alternatively 3 older Ghadr ballistic missiles would be launched against it. This would for both disrupt effective operations as well as devastate the base and render it inoperable within those 10 days. ➡️ Hence just 100 Khorramshahr-4 or 300 Ghadr missile would be sufficient to neutralize that critical link for Israel's airpower Now, since the U.S. would jump in to replace those support assets, it would not make a very big difference operationally at this time The graphic below shows the damage those 100 Khorramshahr would cause -8000 x 25kg Submunitions with 15m shrapnel damage distance assumed - High dispersion of up to 5,5km between two outlier submunitions due to early exo-atmospheric release (Statistical Normal distribution) ➡️ The density of the > mach 3 impacting submunitions would be high enough to devastate that airbase area for a long period ~1000 Khorramshahr hence would be enough to cause such havoc at all Israeli Airbases But Iran won't commit its missile forces to such a scale at this low escalation level