An oil shock fires a familiar reflex — US pump prices, a hotter CPI print, a Fed boxed in. That reflex points at the wrong victim. Strip ~13 MM Bbl/d from global supply at peak — roughly 13% of the world’s ~100 MM Bbl/d, two-to-three times the 1973, 1979, and 1990 shocks — and the damage isn’t a US story; it’s a synchronized stagflationary tax on everyone who imports crude. The US, now roughly oil-neutral, sits closest to the exit: higher prices that bleed consumers also flood domestic producers with revenue, leaving the net hit near zero. The real casualties are Europe, Japan, and above all China and India — growth-sensitive economies structurally short barrels, with no shale cushion to self-insure. Bypass pipelines cap the forfeit at 13 rather than 20, but they run flat-out from day one, a fixed floor with no give. And the cumulative red line — ~2 billion barrels, roughly 20 days of world demand gone — keeps climbing a full quarter after July’s reopening. The shock is global; the safe harbor flies a US flag.
Our new base case is that the world will forfeit 2BN barrels of production...even if the Strait begins to open in July. The problem??? The world cannot lose 2BN barrels of production...the system will break well before then.