Joined September 2015
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Ayush Anand retweeted
ssh.exe -R proves a tunnel exists. It doesn't prove a pivot. Identical flag in all three rows. What separates a benign port-forward from a SOCKS subnet sweep is the shape of the traffic: fan-out and failure count, not the command line. Full breakdown drops Thursday. KQL ES|QL so you hunt it the same day. 🔍
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Ayush Anand retweeted
At this point, it's sad how many intrusions could've been exposed if orgs hadn't been using AV such as WatchGuard, BitDefender, ESET, etc. and just relied on the built-in Defender and getting the alerts centralized somewhere ... Ransomware: 0 detection 3rd party, 65 Defender.
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ssh.exe -R alert on a workstation deserves attention. Attackers abuse SSH remote tunneling to proxy traffic through compromised hosts and reach internal systems. Correlating process and network telemetry in MDE can expose what's happening inside the tunnel. Lab demo 👇 for detection and triage process youtube.com/watch?v=-57OYlKr…
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Ayush Anand retweeted
Can you fix Opus 4.8/4.7 to work for offensive security with proper cyber validation approval? I’m a big fan of Claude code but at this point it’s unusable. 4.6 is usable but it’s hard to justify/advocate for the spend of a model 2 versions behind frontier. @bcherny @AnthropicAI
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Triage before you investigate. In Elastic, this ES|QL query turns an alert flood into a ranked rule list. Two functions do the work: STATS and VALUES. STATS group by rule name and count the alerts. VALUES pulls every distinct host, user, command line, and file path that fired under that rule. No aggregation loss. The full context travels with the count. One row per rule. Count on the left. Evidence on the right.
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Ayush Anand retweeted
For people who just started with #KQL and want to learn why this is AI-slop. Some indicators are explained in the 🧵
AI-slop. KQL AI-slop EVERYWHERE. I'm scared @BertJanCyber 😂
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One host touching 50 internal IPs across 5 ports in under 5 minutes is not “normal admin activity.” That is how ransomware operators map your network before encryption. 👀 The best part? This detection still works when the tool is renamed, packed, or stripped of metadata. Fully tool-agnostic. I shared both the KQL and ESQL versions in the article. More discovery-phase detections soon.
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If you only hunt for netscan.exe, renamed NetScan binaries will slip past you. Hunt the version info and cmdline instead. SoftPerfect NetScan has been used by 32 ransomware gangs as mentioned in Ransomware Tool Matrix from @BushidoToken
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Detection idea: Version info: SoftPerfect / Network Scanner / scanning networks Cmdline: /hide /auto /hide = no GUI /auto: = scan XML output KQL Query here: github.com/Securityinbits/de… More ransomware hunting notes coming soon.
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Ransomware discovery is often louder than encryption. 45 ransomware gangs have used these 3 scanners before impact: • SoftPerfect NetScan • Advanced IP Scanner • Advanced Port Scanner Start hunting the scan phase before the ransom note. More hunt logic below. 🔎
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SoftPerfect NetScan is not just an admin tool. 32 ransomware gangs have used it, and The Gentlemen ransomware used it in a recent @TheDFIRReport case. Hunt it by version info first. Then check cmdline for /hide and /auto. Those flags can turn scanning into quiet recon.
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Detection idea: Version info: SoftPerfect / Network Scanner / scanning networks Cmdline: /hide /auto /hide = no GUI /auto: = scan XML output Use this to hunt today: github.com/Securityinbits/de…
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Ayush Anand retweeted
New blog post covering what's changed in Amatera Stealer 4.0.2 Beta! Plus a bug I found that can be used as a vaccine. - XTEA-encrypted strings - C2 protocol changes (AES -> ECDH P256 ChaCha20-Poly1305) making decryption more difficult - SysCall SSN encoding, decoded just before WoW64Transition esentire.com/blog/amatera-st…
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Ayush Anand retweeted
Many SOC alerts look harmless until you see the pattern. - systeminfo - nltest - net.exe - whoami If these fire within seconds on one host, you may be seeing pre-ransomware discovery. In this lab I simulate the burst with Adaptix C2 and detect it using Sigma in Elastic youtu.be/4xpP2yLYNoE You will see how to: • catch the discovery burst • pivot through process trees • escalate before encryption starts
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Ayush Anand retweeted
Replying to @ramimacisabird
Agree, v2 python looks fixed with debug mode. But check for Iran/Israel looks to be specific function created by the TeamPCP. Vibe coded as usual :) More details x.com/Securityinbits/status/…

Mini Shai-Hulud transformers.pyz is not obfuscated Python Linux stealer has a fallback C2 path that is similar to previous Shai-Hulud dead-drop C2 pattern I checked the latest GitHub commit. No fresh C2 value yet. #TeamPCP will use this when initial C2 fails More details below 👇
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Mini Shai-Hulud transformers.pyz is not obfuscated Python Linux stealer has a fallback C2 path that is similar to previous Shai-Hulud dead-drop C2 pattern I checked the latest GitHub commit. No fresh C2 value yet. #TeamPCP will use this when initial C2 fails More details below 👇
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- Exits if Russian language settings are detected or CPU count is <= 2. - Function says is_israeli_system(), but the geo-check also looks for Israel & Iran markers, then may play audio from C2 and attempt `rm -rf /*`. - Uses multiple collectors to steal credentials from AWS, Azure, Tailscale, password vaults etc.
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This is the github url where we can monitor for dead-drop C2 for v2 Python Linux stealer No change in total count still 32 api.github.com/search/commit…
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