MORE: An “open” strait under Iranian management is not a return to the pre-war status quo and would mean that Iran has accomplished a key war aim. ⬇️ Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi discussed the strait at length and noted that it is under Iranian and Omani sovereignty and that both countries will collect fees after the MoU. Iran will also manage the strait. Araghchi rejected the term “tolls” but defended Iran charging “service“ fees for passage through the strait, which is effectively an attempt to rebrand Iran’s protection racket as legal administration. Araghchi added that Iran would provide safe passage through the strait for civilian vessels but create separate arrangements for military vessels. This system of management is at odds with both US policy and long-established maritime legal precedent. US President Donald Trump has repeatedly said, for example, that the strait must be open with no fees or Iranian management. A US official told Reuters that the agreement would “open” the strait, but an “open” strait under Iranian management would be very detrimental to US interests, as ISW-CTP has previously argued in @brian_cartr's essay in the post below. Iran also continues to use force in an attempt to impose the reality that it controls the Strait of Hormuz. US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on June 12 that US forces intercepted multiple Iranian drones targeting commercial vessels in the strait. Iranian media separately reported explosions near Qeshm and Sirik islands and said the sounds came from warning shots that Iranian forces fired to enforce control over the strait.

3/ Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi’s readout of the MoU is largely consistent with IRGC-affiliated media’s readout of the latest possible agreement, which may indicate a growing consensus among Iranian regime leaders on Iran’s red lines for negotiations.

2/ Iran is likely attempting to structure the MoU and the phasing of a final agreement to reduce US leverage before later negotiations over the nuclear program. Iranian media appears to be portraying a possible MoU as a tactical pause in the war rather than a final settlement.

MORE: Other issues—like when Iran can access frozen funds and how much it will be able to access—remain issues in negotiations as well. There also appear to be some disagreements between Iran and the United States over the Iranian nuclear program, but it is unclear what specific disagreements exist.

NEW: CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping met with WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un from June 8 to 9 in Xi’s first visit to Pyongyang since 2019. Xi’s calls for closer cooperation between the PRC and North Korea and likely tacit acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear status reflect PRC efforts to maintain positive relations with North Korea amid closer alignment between Pyongyang and Moscow. Other Key Takeaways: KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun finished her US visit on June 12. Cheng met with US policy makers and academics and espoused standard KMT talking points and some rhetoric reminiscent of PRC statements. The PRC MoT conducted a “special maritime law enforcement operation” east of Taiwan from June 6 to 10 to assert PRC jurisdiction over the disputed waters, contesting Japanese-Philippine talks to delimit their overlapping EEZ claims. The exercise was likely intended to reinforce PRC claims over Taiwan and to exercise PRC A2AD operations.

NEW: Russian forces may launch an Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile at Ukraine in the next 24 to 48 hours. Other Key Takeaways: Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to posture Russian military strength during Russia’s June 12 Russia Day holiday while also acknowledging some of the battlefield setbacks Russian forces have faced in recent months. A Russian State Duma Deputy from the Communist Party criticized the Kremlin and the broader Russian war-waging strategy ahead of Russia Day, contradicting the Kremlin's narrative. Russian sources released several pieces of footage showing Russian forces operating in Kostyantynivka as part of a deliberate cognitive warfare effort to exaggerate the Russian presence in the city. Russian forces continue to make tactical gains within Kostyantynivka and Ukraine’s ability to defend the southeastern sections of the city is deteriorating, however. Russian forces continue making tactical gains in Kostyantynivka — Russia’s assessed main effort for the Spring-Summer 2026 offensive — and have likely consolidated some tactical positions within the city beyond infiltration. These gains have taken Russian forces a long time to achieve and have come at a great cost. Russian forces will likely make tactical gains in Kostyantynivka in Summer 2026 but remain unlikely to achieve a rapid operational breakthrough against the Fortress Belt writ large. Russia is building at least five long-range drone launch sites in western Russia close to the border with Belarus likely to support drone strikes against Ukraine, possibly by exploiting Belarusian airspace. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in the Oleksandrivka direction. Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure on the night of June 11 and 12. Russian forces launched 117 drones against Ukraine overnight.

NEW: Persistent internal disagreements remain among Iranian regime leaders over the concessions that the regime should accept in negotiations with the United States. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle appear to continue to seek an agreement that meets Iranian maximalist demands and would be tantamount to a US surrender. Other Iranian officials appear to have disputed a draft memorandum leaked by IRGC-linked and state media. Other Key Takeaways: Conflicting US and Iranian accounts of the MoU suggest that the United States and Iran remain far apart on several core issues, however. It remains unclear whether these public statements accurately reflect each side’s negotiating position or the contents of the agreement, given competition between the IRGC and the formal negotiating team. Iranian statements and Iran’s continued use of force and coercion in the Strait of Hormuz indicate that the regime remains unwilling to relinquish its claims to control over the waterway. Any US-Iran agreement must require Iran to abandon efforts to establish long-term authority over the strait. Iranian forces continue to employ coercive measures to force vessels to transit through Iran’s illegal traffic separation scheme and comply with its protection racket. Hezbollah’s efforts to decentralize its military structure may be enabling the group to conduct more effective defenses of specific areas in southern Lebanon than it was able to muster in Fall 2024. The IRGC reportedly reorganized Hezbollah’s C2 system starting in late 2024, and the shift towards unit independence and mobility would theoretically enable Hezbollah fighters to execute more effective defenses against Israeli advances in several sectors across southern Lebanon. “IRGC-linked” figures acting on Iran’s behalf reportedly warned unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders to resist surrendering militia weapons to the Iraqi state in the days after Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi’s successful formation of a new government in May 2026. Iran’s reported opposition to Iraqi militia disarmament at this time conflicts with several other reports that Iran has encouraged some Iraqi militias to end their kinetic operations in exchange for solidifying Iranian-backed Iraqi control over the Iraqi state, however.