$MMTLP 100% accurate. Every claim backed by an SEC filing. x.com/i/grok/share/5593c8ab0…

$MMTLP ICYMI -> #NBH posted all of the S-1 correspondence with the SEC on the S-1 filing and they are worth reading. sec.gov/edgar/search/#… They prove that NBH filings were materially deficient in financial reporting, the A series share ownership, and McCabe's loan stack among, the deals to acquire wildcat, orogrande valuation and several other things. The takeaways: 1. NBH posted the red herring initial S-1 on 1/23/23, then delayed it on 1/31/23. NBH held it in delayed status by their own choice ans formally submitted it to the SEC until July 26, 2024. ≈536 days NBH delayed formally submitting the S-1 to the SEC 2. The SEC's first feedback letter was filed 9/20/24 after significant accounting data was complete. That's ≈631 days, about 50% of the all time record. Please send a partipation trophy to Next Bridge. 3. Next Bridge determined the Orogrande needed to be impaired to $0 two weeks after the spin off and initial asset valuation was reported as $77 million. Citing that they used MMATs asset valuation upfront and determined they wouldn't be able to meet the obligations. They had to revise the language from "due accounting firm determined" to "management deternined" that the valuation was $0. The SEC inquiry was post hoc, debunking the claims that the SEC made them do it. 4. The SEC completed their review of the S-1 on 9/30/25 , cutting the total time to 376 days. 4. Next Bridge delayed it again from 1/29/26 to 5/19/26 as they continued to repair their Financials in five filed amendments not requiring SEC review. Subtract 111 days to bring the historical landmark victory to 265 days. 5. There were a total of 7 legit rounds of SEC reviews over that ≈ 9 month span, driven by Next Bridge as they corrected their financial and corporate structure. 6. Names Brda as the owner of Wildcat and reveals McCabe is invested in Brda's Olivan Advisors, rebranded as PacWest Partners. 7. SEC auditor inquired strongly that Preferred A shareholders issued the dividend at the MMAT merger were shafted by the two-week $77M to $0 asset impairment, NBH dissmisssd the OG TRCH shareholders as MMAT shareholders who were a minority of the base, they had no rights to the assets from TRCH.

Too much garbage being posted on this topic. Here's the legit read on $VIX The VIX isn’t a stock or ETF — it’s the market’s fear gauge. Its underlying is the S&P 500 Index options market (specifically SPX options). VIX is calculated from SPX option prices and represents expected S&P 500 volatility over the next 30 days. It doesn’t predict direction, it shows how much movement traders are pricing in. When VIX spikes, SPX protection is usually being bid aggressively. That’s why Friday’s move matters. $VIX closed at 21.51, up 39.68%. Clear volatility expansion and risk-off warning. What stood out: • Daily: breakout from volatility compression • 1H: aggressive expansion above EMA 5/10/20 • 15M: clean trend, shallow pullbacks, dips defended • 5M: stair-step continuation into the close VPA read: strong effort, strong result. Order-flow proxy: protection bids hedging aggression. Key levels I’m watching: • Above 21.57 = volatility continuation • Hold above 20.20–20.65 = fear stays in control • Lose 20.20 = first cooling signal • Below 19.05 = intraday vol unwind • Below 17.25–17.40 = spike likely failed / resetting For Monday: pairing SPY daily SPY 15M VIX 15M. Bearish confirmation: SPY loses support while VIX holds above 20.20 and pushes through 21.57. Bullish relief: VIX rejects 21.57, loses 20.20, and SPY reclaims key levels on volume. Friday’s VIX move says traders were aggressively paying for protection into the close.

$MMTLP No it doesn't do that at all. Its strictly procedural. This simply moves the offering from a preliminary S-1/A to a live 424(b)(3) prospectus. Same 40M shares. Same $15 fantasy price. Same no-market/no-DTC reality. Same first-priority use of proceeds: payoff Greg Jr.'s Panther Bridge investors.

RDOs usually close with about 25% sold. The debt service will absorb most if not all of it. $MMTLP / $NBH's real math is ugly. Check it out: Torchlight’s best revenue year was roughly $5.45M. NBH’s current liabilities are roughly $62M. That means NBH would need ~11.4x Torchlight’s best annual revenue just to cover current liabilities at a fantasy 100% margin. At more realistic O&G cash margins, the revenue hurdle looks more like: • 60% margin: ~$104M revenue • 50% margin: ~$124M revenue • 40% margin: ~$155M revenue • 30% margin: ~$207M revenue That is roughly 19x–38x Torchlight’s best year. Next Bridge will never generate the revenue to be profitablr. It is a pass through shell to drive cash to McCabes family.

$MMTLP / NBH is offering new shares directly to selected accredited investors via a reasonable best efforts registered direct placement. This is not an open-market purchase; Roth Capital and NBH control who receives an allocation. Even if Roth allocated some newly issued primary shares to a broker-dealer or participant with legacy MMTLP/NBH fail-to-deliver or short exposure, Reg SHO Rule 204, 17 CFR § 242.204, still requires FTDs to be closed out by borrowing or purchasing, on the open market, securities of like kind and quantity in a manner that allows proper delivery, clearance, and settlement. A direct issuer allocation does not automatically cure a legacy fail or short obligation. The newly issued shares must actually be legally deliverable, cleared, and accepted against the specific pre-existing position. That process is not publicly confirmed here because: NBH shares have no established secondary trading market; the S-1 states, “There is no established trading market for the shares of common stock and we do not expect a market to develop.” They are not DTC-eligible. There is no ordinary lending pool or clearing mechanism. Bottom line: A broker-dealer with legacy NBH/MMTLP fails cannot simply point to a direct offering allocation and declare the fail cured. This offering creates new registered shares and brings cash into the company. It does not create a normal market-based close-out mechanism for old obligations. Rule 105 only blocks recent restricted-period shorts from using the offering as a loophole. Rule 204 is the standing close-out rule for FTDs, but Rule 204 still requires an actual borrow/purchase and valid delivery/settlement not merely possession of newly allocated direct offering shares.