This is less a commentary on Harvey and more a commentary on the general phenomenon of best-in-class growth companies raising successive rounds at higher and higher valuations: most of these financings make no sense.
Growth equity capital is very expensive. “Dilution is low” is not a good justification for these rounds — dilution is related to but decidedly not the same as cost.
To offer a crude example: if you believe your business is worth $5B, and a firm offers you $10M at a $1B valuation, you will tell that firm to pound sand. That dilution is only 1% is irrelevant; the implied cost of equity is simply far too high.
Maybe these companies believe their investors’ cost of equity is appropriate. Even still: the money is still expensive relative to the other forms of capital available, meaning it ought to be used for the most ambitious endeavors that present unstructured risks with unbounded upside (read: high-value product R&D and strategic M&A). Instead, companies at this scale typically deploy a substantial majority of their expensive equity dollars into highly predictable, relatively low risk GTM initiatives that offer range-bounded returns (or even worse, do nothing with these dollars, letting them collect dust in treasuries).
This is terrible capital allocation. In the worst cases, it’s directly value-destructive, yielding lower returns than the cost of capital. At best, it’s deeply inefficient: these activities consume capital that would be best deployed elsewhere.
Sometimes, these rounds involve secondary transactions between shareholders and no primary capital (so no dilution). This doesn’t solve the core issue. Shifting around who owns the most expensive form of capital doesn’t change the fact that this capital is being used inappropriately — and that these companies should finance their GTM investments differently.
Moreover, this conversation totally misses the point. The persistent liquidity and DPI issues that Silicon Valley faces aren’t only downstream of an an onerous regulatory/compliance regime or the broken supply/demand mismatch in private markets — they are downstream of busted balance sheets across the entire industry. If companies appropriately capitalized themselves with the right balance sheets, they could actively buy back stock in these transactions rather than simply shifting ownership between parties, offering liquidity with “negative dilution” and allowing shareholders to capture a greater share of value moving forward.
Private markets are the new public markets.
It's notable that in many of these rounds, companies are only selling 2-3%, and it's likely secondary.
These rounds aren't really fundraising," they are valuation signaling and liquidity. Deep pools of private capital are desperate for allocation in top-tier assets, and founders are happy to oblige... we made it too difficult to be a public company with regulatory headaches and founders saw the opportunity to avoid the volatility of public markets, so here we are, and now retail misses out on the runups of these companies.