Finally, the casket is opened: we ( @h0t_max and @_Dmit) have extracted Intel x86 microcode! One more Intel "top secret" information gets revealed...
github.com/chip-red-pill/glm…
It seems Intel moved from Foxton microcontroller to Tensilica Xtensa for p-unit firmware (pcode) in newest server CPU (Sapphire Rapids and Emerald Rapids used in Eagle Stream platform)...
Next are the most interesting:
EAR - CPU bringup stall in PCU fw
PHYSICAL_DEBUG_ENABLED - sets CONSET in DFX AGG
CFG_UNLOCK - activates NOA (Node Observation Architecture) bus in DFX Green
SAFE_MODE_BOOT - disables active state power management
What a huge field to research: rdmsr microcode for desktop CPUs speculates that CREGPLA (data struct describing each MSR, hardcoded in HW and obtained via MSR2CR uop) entry is valid!
Below is a fragment of CNL microcode simulation via Archsim tool for rdmsr instruction:
🔥 Read the new article by our researcher Timofey Duditsky.
The write-up dives into the AMD Platform Configuration Blobs mechanism, shows how it works, and reveals the vulnerability CVE-2025-54502.
swarm.ptsecurity.com/slowbur…
AMD has published Security Bulletin AMD-SB-7054 with my vulnerability CVE-2025-54502. There has been no feedback on my research (as well as my mention), so I will publish my work as it is and as soon as possible.
This is made possible by executing arbitrary microcode on the DFX-locked system. And although this was a truly challenging task, we were able to do it after researching in details the interaction between PMC and PUNIT
Yes, Intel has declared this first SGX implementation as obsolete and unsupported, but its fundamental break means that the HW Root of Trust approach is not unshakable. The full white paper is coming...
Since I completely forgot to post on X this thing I've done last year, I might as well quote someone else's post that mentions it :)
Thanks @_markel___ , your work actually helped a ton!
Hardware glitching masters have taken on Intel's microarchitecture - very, very cool! I'm so glad our work is contributing to research that was previously unimaginable. Research into hardware attacks on Intel processors has enormous potential...
download.vusec.net/papers/mi…
I'm amazed at Intel's ability to downplay the severity of published vulnerabilities.
They described CVE-2018-3640 (Rogue System Register Read) as simply an ASLR bypass, but this vulnerability in fact allows the CPU internal CRBUS to be read (at least for Goldmont/Plus uarch)
Using this vulnerability for the rdpmc instruction, we were able to read the SGX SVN Key - the first derived key from the Root Provisioning Key and Global Wrapping Key for
Gemini Lake platform that's stored at 0x2205 and 0x2206 of the internal control registers
The reason why Intel will continue to dominate on the server market is that server power efficiency is not determined by compute efficiency, but rather by the balance between idle power consumption and wake-up speed, which is something Intel excels at...
It confirms our previous assumptions (speculative micro-instruction execution), introduces a whole new class of spectre attacks (uspectre) and shows that a number of recent TE vulnerabilities (such as Rogue System Register Read) actually originate in the microcode...
Hardware glitching masters have taken on Intel's microarchitecture - very, very cool! I'm so glad our work is contributing to research that was previously unimaginable. Research into hardware attacks on Intel processors has enormous potential...
download.vusec.net/papers/mi…
Finally, I was able to reliably answer the question of whether C6SRAM (holds CPU core context in C6 power state) is connected in any way to L2: no, it is an independent SRAM
In the screen below, after shutting down L2 via PCU (reducing its voltage to 0), the L2 Machine Check bank (CR 0x385) immediately shows an error, but C6SRAM (Staging Buffer in our paper for udbgrd/wr) is still working...