Faisal Roble’s article in Wardheernews is timely and raises important points. That said, I would like to make three historical revisions to ensure accuracy.
As Jama M. Ghalib (1995, p. 123), the police commissioner who imprisoned and captured the mutineers, and who also hails from Hargeisa, records:
“Many Somalis in both the North and the South, mistakenly believed — and have since maintained — that the rising led by Hassan Keyd on 10 December 1961, was part of a broader northern secessionist manifestation.” He continued, stating, “I can confirm that there were no wider separatist tendencies. The ‘coup’ attempt, as it came to be called, resulted only from the young officers’ dissatisfaction over the lack of comparable adjustments of military rank upon the integration of the Somaliland Scouts Regiment into the Somali National Army, six months after the Union.”
Abdi Samatar (2016, pp. 111-114) supports this and notes that there is limited evidence of regional discontent as the main motive. Samatar states that the officers’ legal defence admitted guilt to mutiny but explicitly denied it to a coup d’état. The government’s subsequent actions, including paying legal fees and not appealing a dismissal on minor technicalities, further suggest it was not regarded as a fundamental threat to the union.
Misrepresentation of the Hassan Kayd Mutiny
Faisal describes the mutiny as “an early expression of the secession that the SNM implemented” and a “precursor to the formation of the SNM.” This is historically inaccurate. The mutiny was a military grievance over ranks and pay—not a demand for secession.
(1) No civilian politicians, clan elders, or the public supported it.
(2) The prosecution charged the officers with mutiny and insubordination, not treason or separatism.
(3) The mutineers treated captured southern officers with respect and did not declare a breakaway state.
(4) The Somali government paid their legal fees, which is inconsistent with treating them as secessionists.
By framing this mutiny as proto‑secessionist, the essay misleads readers about the actual origins of secessionist thought in the North.
Plurality: The missing “s” and the nature of the protectorates
Faisal repeatedly refers to the “Somaliland Protectorate” in the singular. In fact, Britain signed six separate protectorate treaties (plural) with different clans (Gadabursi, Habar Awal, Habar Yonis, Habar Jeclo, Issa, Warsangeli). The singular phrasing is not a minor typo, it erases the fragmented, treaty‑by‑clan legal reality. This lack of precision reflects a genuine lack of insight, as the plural nature of these protectorates is central to understanding which clans were bound by which colonial arrangements.
Exaggerated uniqueness of intermarriage
Faisal claims: “No other Somali clans can claim the degree of intermarriage between the Dhulbahante and Habar Jeclo/Habar Yonis.” This assertion is unsupported and highly dubious. Comparable or even higher levels of intermarriage exist across many Somali regions. For example, between Sool and Nugaal, Sanaag and Bari, and along the long corridor from Mudug, Ogaden region and Galguduud to the south, centuries of mixing have created dense kinship ties across conventional boundaries, not to mention Warsangeli and Habar Yonis, Samaroon and Habar Awal or Issa and Samaroon. He provides no comparative citation for this claim of “uniqueness.” Maybe he used this claimed uniqueness as an emotional anchor for reconciliation or goodwill, but exaggerating it weakens his overall argument.
Again, I appreciate this timely essay in Wardheernews and the important points within it. I offer these reviews only to strengthen historical accuracy, not to detract from his broader contribution.
wardheernews.com/somaliland-…