It's obviously misdirected to go after the "Twitter randos" here - we should assume adversaries have far better OSINT capabilities than hobbyists.
But there's a valid point here, which goes like this: A hobbyist near a US military base spots an unusual aircraft movement and posts it to a small account. Then, a larger OSINT account picks it up and amplifies it.
Now that observation is distributed at scale where adversaries can monitor it in real time. State actors may not have assets positioned near every base, but they don't need to anymore - social media does that work for them.
The answer obviously isn't to ban OSINT, which is a laughably stupid thing to even type out and impossible, but to plan operations assuming this information is already out there and to stop acting like OSINT is some kind of major OPSEC leak.
👀 US AFCENT Chief of Weapons and Tactics, Maj. Claire Randolph talks about the complexity of maintaining OPSEC during June 2025 strikes on Iran, because of "Twitter Randos".
"You have twitter feeds of Randos that are just studying where our airplanes go and publishing it..."