Causation, causation, causation
A lot of people this week have drawn the obvious allusions between the disruption caused by climate protesters & the disruptions caused by climate-related weather events, like the flash flooding in Valencia. A key part of the disparate treatment by the law of these disruptions arises from the concept of causation.
Causation is the concept defining which causes & effects can be linked; & just because they can be definitely linked *factually* does not mean they can be linked *legally*. When our common law was originally created centuries ago, causation was reasonably simple because it was difficult to have an effect on anything or anyone outside your immediate physical surroundings or distant from you in time. That is no longer true: people & companies can now through their actions cause huge harm, death & destruction to people on the other side of the planet, or in a different century to them. However the law simply had not caught up; in effect we are currently trying to deal with 21st century levels of complexity, with a legal system based on 17th century notions on causation.
The result can be seen in many of the absurdities about how the law deals with the climate crisis: from things like climate protesters not having necessity defences as their actions are deemed too remote from the threat, to fossil fuel companies executives having no legal liability for the huge & clearly quantifiable & evidenced harm they are causing.