The developer relations community on Solana. 300 verified members. Directory, events, and resources for DevRel professionals.

Joined March 2026
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Solana Actions & Blinks: transactions from a URL Solana Actions turn any URL into a signable transaction; Blinks unfurl them into inline UI. @saydialect β€” read it in the reply ↓
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Agave: what it is and why Solana's validator got renamed Agave is the Anza-maintained validator client that runs most of Solana β€” the renamed continuation of the original Solana Labs validator. @anza_xyz β€” read it in the reply ↓
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devrels.xyz retweeted
Introducing the Solana RPC Working Group Its mission is to advance Solana's open-source RPC stack, making the read layer more accessible for all. Built in the open by @triton_one, @Helius, @JupiterExchange, @anza_xyz, and @SolanaFndn 🧡
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TEEs on Solana: confidential compute by trusting the chip TEEs run code in hardware-isolated enclaves with remote attestation β€” and they're already in Jito BAM, MagicBlock, and Switchboard. Read it in the reply ↓
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OTL: the Open Transaction Layer for compliant onchain transactions Fireblocks-founded OTL is a 5-layer open protocol for coordinating compliant onchain transactions β€” identity, Travel Rule, and where Solana fits. The Solana developer directory.
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devrels.xyz by the numbers (Jun 11): πŸ‘€ 461 Solana devs 🏒 216 orgs πŸ“¦ 120 projects 🧰 55 resources πŸ“ 91 articles The Solana developer directory β†’ devrels.xyz
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devrels.xyz by the numbers (Jun 11): πŸ‘€ 461 Solana devs 🏒 216 orgs πŸ“¦ 120 projects 🧰 55 resources πŸ“ 91 articles The Solana developer directory β†’ devrels.xyz
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devrels.xyz retweeted
Raydium is aware of an exploit involving unauthorized removal of liquidity from its legacy AMM V3 program which was previously phased out in 2021. No current users of Raydium are affected by this exploit or would have been able to interact with these pools through the UI since their deprecation. Raydium’s SDK and DAPP do not support mainnet interactions with legacy AMM V3 pools. The exploiter’s address is: 4WnPebowR4HHfumvNPaDjG6Pa5Hi1jxLm6xmmBq33QVk There were 5 pools affected: Sollet USDT - RAY Sollet ETH - RAY SRM - RAY USDC - RAY RAY - SOL An initial review of exploited assets of value are: ~150,177 RAY ~5,603 SOL ~893,700 USDC The market value of assets exploited is ~$1.34m. Full compensation will be handled by Raydium’s treasury. Legacy AMM V3 was previously only enabled to use deposited funds to place orders on the Serum order book. The program did not provide swap functionality and following the deprecation of Serum, the associated liquidity remained idle. For proportion checks, the program relied on the LP token supply. The vulnerability stemmed from insufficient validation of the LP mint. Because the program did not properly verify the LP mint address, an attacker was able to create a new mint and use it as the LP token, bypassing the intended proportion checks. By contrast, all other Raydium mainnet programs use a virtual supply mechanism for proportion checks and correctly verify the LP mint along with all other relevant account information, preventing this class of vulnerability. It is important to note that the vulnerability was caused by a self-contained logic flaw, not a key compromise or authority-level issue, so there is no propagation risk. Raydium's current programs are unaffected by this exploit. @Raydium core contributors are conducting a security review on all mainnet programs.
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