And he absolutely should be stopped.
Alex Bores is a Democratic New York Assemblymember and congressional candidate who has made AI regulation central to his public agenda. He sponsored New York’s RAISE Act, aimed at large frontier AI developers, and has now laid out a broader federal AI framework touching child safety, data privacy, deepfakes, labor markets, data centers, workplace decisions, and AI deployment.
Presented as “AI safety,” the plan sounds narrow and technical. But read closely, it points toward something much larger: a federal regulatory architecture for supervising the software layer through which modern economic and social life increasingly runs. In that sense, it risks becoming a government takeover of the internet and the digital economy in sheep’s clothing—not by seizing the infrastructure outright, but by regulating the intelligent software embedded into nearly everything that happens on it.
If AI becomes embedded in ordinary software, internal workflows, customer support tools, medical administration, HR systems, insurance triage, sales platforms, productivity suites, code editors, educational tools, and consumer interfaces—which is inevitable—then regulating “AI systems,” as Bores’ plan calls for, becomes a way of regulating ordinary organizational judgment wherever software mediates it.
That is the basic problem. “AI” is not going to remain a chatbot. It is becoming a layer in the stack.
Bores’ plan slides from “frontier model safety” into broader controls over deployment, data use, labor markets, deepfakes, children’s products, workplace decisions, energy infrastructure, licensing, and redistribution. At that point, “AI policy” becomes a container for a much larger political economy agenda.
Let’s do a substitution test and replace “AI” with “software” to reveal the latent scope of this plan:
“‘Software’ cannot be the sole decision-maker in hiring, firing, or promotion.” That sounds much less narrow once one notices that HR software, scoring systems, resume filters, scheduling systems, call-center analytics, productivity dashboards, and management workflows will all contain AI components.
“Consumers should know what data ‘software systems’ collected.” That sounds less like a targeted AI rule and more like an expansive data-rights regime covering nearly every modern software interaction.
“Companies should report ‘software-related’ workforce changes.” That sounds less like labor-market transparency and more like federal oversight of almost every automation, dashboard, CRM upgrade, logistics optimization, or customer-service tool that affects staffing.
“‘Software systems’ must be tested, documented, audited, and monitored.” That sounds prudent until those duties attach not only to frontier labs but to ordinary businesses integrating model APIs into routine operations.
So the central problem is not merely “this is too much regulation.” It is that the plan may rely on a false ontology: it treats AI as a separable class of systems when the market is moving toward AI as a pervasive computational substrate.
There is also a constitutional and administrative-state angle. The more AI regulation governs speech-like outputs, ranking, recommendation, inference, explanation, classification, and decision-support, the more it runs into questions about compelled speech, prior restraint, due process, vagueness, delegation, and viewpoint-sensitive enforcement. The problem is not just cost. It is discretionary power.