It is fair to say that neither Ukraine nor Russia is winning the war.
For Zelenskyy, this is good news: only yesterday, many were predicting his defeat. For Putin, it is bad news: no one seriously believes anymore that he is winning.
Yet Putin does not want to end the war. He seems to have five basic choices, but after four years of full-scale war, his core problem is clear: none of them gives him a guaranteed result.
A technological breakthrough? It takes time and offers no guarantee of a success.
A tactical breakthrough? Ukraine may adapt faster than Russia can turn it into strategic gain.
Mobilization? The Kremlin’s cheapest instrument, but one that raises the domestic cost of war.
A new theater of war? It may shift attention, but it does not guarantee a quick victory.
Nuclear weapons? Shock effect, but with uncontrollable consequences for Moscow itself.
So he will most likely do what he does best: buy time. He will move, in fragments, along the first four tracks and keep threatening the fifth.
Ukraine’s options remain unchanged: strike deeper, defend the sky, and strengthen resilience at home — politically, financially, and militarily. This has worked so far. It can keep working.