Cambodia is one of the world's top pepper producers. Its pepper ranks among the highest quality globally, with high density, strong flavor, and the second-highest on-farm yield among major producing countries. This article focuses on Cambodia's regular commodity pepper sector, not the geographically indicated (GI) Kampot Pepper industry. While Kampot Pepper follows a premium-value model with specialized export channels, most Cambodian pepper is produced outside the GI zone, particularly in provinces bordering Vietnam, and is traded as a commodity crop. This sounds like a success story, but it is not. According to a 2025 value-chain analysis commissioned by the European Union and implemented by GIZ, an estimated 84–90 % of Cambodia's pepper production is exported. Roughly 87 % is grown in provinces bordering Vietnam, where informal cross-border trade is common. Based on official import figures from Vietnam's General Department of Customs, UN Comtrade data, and production estimates, Cambodia supplied between 40 and 45% of Vietnam's pepper imports in 2023 and 2024. Meanwhile, according to Cambodia's Ministry of Commerce, Vietnam accounted for 67.9 % of Cambodia's pepper exports in 2025. Yet much of this trade is informal. Cambodian pepper crosses the border, enters Vietnamese warehouses, and reappears on international markets as Vietnamese pepper. Cambodia receives neither the recognition nor the premium associated with that trade. If Cambodia processed and exported its full crop directly, the sector could add an estimated USD 48 million in value, roughly 67 % more than it earns today. The question is not whether Cambodia can produce pepper. It is why the system operates this way. The answer begins with money. According to Khmer Times, production costs average USD 2.59 per kilogram, while pepper prices reached between 25,000 and 26,500 riel per kilogram (approximately USD 6.10–6.50) in 2025, according to the Cambodia Pepper and Spice Federation. On paper, that leaves a healthy margin. In reality, many farmers cannot wait to realize it. According to pepper-producing agricultural cooperatives in Tboung Khmum, an estimated 40 % of farmers' pepper income goes directly to debt repayment at harvest time. Debt comes due regardless of market conditions, forcing farmers to sell immediately for cash, even when waiting could generate a better return. The deeper problem is that Cambodia's pepper sector operates largely outside the formal financial system. Banks generally do not accept harvested pepper as collateral. Farmers can borrow against land or equipment, but not against pepper sitting in storage. As a result, they cannot access financing to delay sales and wait for better prices. One proven solution is a Warehouse Receipt System (WRS). Under a WRS, farmers store crops in certified warehouses and receive a warehouse receipt that can be used as collateral for a bank loan. This allows them to meet short-term financial obligations while retaining ownership of their crop until market conditions improve. According to the GIZ report, the informal system exists because the formal system never fully emerged. Vietnamese traders fill the vacuum by crossing the border, paying cash, and buying everything regardless of quality. This is not a new problem. According to Khmer Times, the government has been drafting a national pepper policy since 2018. Fresh News reported that the Ministry of Commerce expected the policy to be finalized in Q1 2026 and submitted to the Council of Ministers in Q2 2026. The same report quoted Secretary of State Sok Heng Bora saying the ministry was working to strengthen credit access for farmers and processors. Eight months later, the policy remains unfinished. Until it arrives, improved credit access remains an intention rather than a tool farmers can use. Cambodia grows the pepper, but much of the value still leave #Chakinsight #chaktomukinsight #Cambodia #Pepper #Vietnam #Trade Author: Muyhong

I think @BangkokPostNews needs a correction. Apparently there are no scammers or any scam activity in Thailand 🇹🇭

Correct! Why are some Thais so toxic about this matter?

Cowtin claimed it’s Thai territory but provided no legal basis. 🇹🇭🐮 Or is cow’s word the only basis?

Who said there are no scammers in Thailand? 🇹🇭

The Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts has condemned the recent destruction of a wooden staircase leading to K'nar Temple. Thai military personnel were observed pouring petrol on the staircase, which was built in 2017, before setting it alight. phnompenhpost.com/national/t…

10 million Khmer people are there. They still speak Khmer and preserve their culture.

Of course, we want peace 🕊️

Here it is. The same place, Kampong Trach, Kampot. 🇰🇭

The point is here: Who the hell does that barbed wire belong to? 🇰🇭 or 🇹🇭?

The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) Board of Directors approved $2.5 billion in new strategic investments in several countries aimed at strengthening U.S. supply chains, expanding U.S. energy exports, supporting regional peace and stability, and bolstering economic cooperation. Among the approved deals, DFC plans to invest in supporting the expansion of Cambodia’s aviation infrastructure and promote broader economic opportunities for trade, economic growth and development. Learn about the $2.5 billion in strategic investments that DFC’s Board of Directors approved:

So how could the Thailiban 🇹🇭 come back & put barbed wire on a conflict zone or undemarcated area? There’re already many cows in Cowland, but Cow @visegrad24 🇵🇱 is back to make even more cows! 🐮

Looking out over Nagaworld, 🇰🇭National Assembly, event halls on Diamond Island, Buddhist Institute (Left) and 🇦🇺 Australian Embassy (Right). June 2010. I used to work at Buddhist Institute when everything around it was still empty, except for Nagaworld. - Picture: Dan Besant

The heritage of Preah Vihear Temple, a UNESCO World Heritage site, suffered severe damage from artillery and airstrikes by Thai troops during the Cambodia-Thailand border clashes in July and December 2025. Video: Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts. #ThailandCambodia

If this was a country, it isn’t anymore.

Sihasak Phuangketkeow warned Cambodia against using international forums to “attack” Thailand, arguing that disputes between the two neighbours should be resolved through dialogue rather than international escalation. According to an official report received from Military Region 4 of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, 22 rounds of unprovoked gunfire were heard on the morning of May 24, 2026, between 09:24 AM and 10:10 AM, near the O’Smach International Border Checkpoint in Oddar Meanchey Province. The gunfire was reportedly fired by Thai military forces in an area of Cambodian territory currently occupied by Thai troops. The concern did not stop there. On May 25, 2026, Military Region 4 of the RCAF contacted Thailand’s Army Area 2 to inquire about another incident involving 8 gunshots heard on the night of May 24. These shots were suspected to have come from the Thai side, including 5 shots at 19:57 in the Phnom Trob area and 3 shots at 20:08 in the Phnom Sambok Khmum area of Preah Vihear Province. What makes these incidents politically significant is not only the gunfire itself, but Thailand’s response. Since the multiple reported gunfire incidents on May 24, the Thai military has remained silent. This is notable because, in previous cases, Thai military officials often responded quickly by offering explanations, such as describing the sounds as accidents or fireworks, or by accusing Cambodia of making false claims. This is where the timing matters. While Bangkok’s diplomatic narrative quickly moved to criticize Cambodia’s internationalization of the dispute, the Thai military, which was accused of firing the shots, remained quiet on the ground-level facts. That contrast creates a clear communication pattern: Bangkok speaks loudly about dialogue, while the military avoids public clarification on the reported shooting incidents. The pattern suggests that Thailand is trying to shift the dispute from a question of border accountability to a question of diplomatic behavior. Instead of publicly addressing Cambodia’s specific reports of gunfire, Thailand’s message focuses on criticizing Cambodia’s use of international forums. This allows Thailand to present itself as the side defending dialogue, while avoiding direct public clarification of what happened on the ground. This pattern is not limited to land-border incidents. A similar logic can be seen in Thailand’s handling of maritime disputes. After Cambodia urged Thailand to proceed under the UNCLOS compulsory conciliation framework following Thailand’s termination of the MOU framework, Bangkok still emphasized that the process should begin with sincere bilateral talks. This suggests that Sihasak’s wording was carefully designed to reposition Thailand as the actor controlling the diplomatic process. In this sense, Thailand’s strategy appears to be about controlling the arena of the dispute. If the issue remains bilateral, Thailand can manage the pace, framing, and level of scrutiny. If the issue moves to international forums, Cambodia gains a wider platform to raise questions of accountability, verification, and compliance. #chakinsight #chaktomukinsight #Cambodia #Thailand Author: PanhaCHEZDA

OPINION: Attacks on Preah Vihear temple hurt all world heritage Global community must support Cambodia to protect and restore World Heritage Site s.nikkei.com/3RiZm4d

Kandal Province Governor said any informant who provides credible information about online scam locations will receive a $500 reward, amid Cambodian leaders’ orders for provincial authorities to eliminate online scam operations or risk losing their positions.

🇰🇭 Train from Phnom Penh to Battambang, 1992 - David Brock