with each halving bitcoin is getting less secure.
once we are done with the reward issuance, then what? will government subsidy miners to keep them securing the network?
right now miners get roughly $100,000,000 per day from new coins and ~$264,000 per day from fees.
that’s ~0.26% fees.
after 4 halvings, fees are still a rounding error. empirically, fee revenue has been negative-to-flat vs subsidy cuts (like -0.32 to 0.0). the market already answered “will fees just scale up?” with “nope”.
the 2024 halving. fees briefly hit ~16% of rewards during the runes/ordinals mania, then bled back to ~1% within months.
1%!!!
year-on-year, fees were down ~79.91% and tx volume down ~25%. yeah, 2140 gonna be fine.
and you’re part of the problem (not judging). lightning network (bitcoin's l2) made txs 97–99.9% cheaper: 1 sat vs $0.30–$2.00 btc mainnet. volume up like 266–317% in 2024–2025. so if bitcoin bros will get disgusted by paying fees on the l1 that are are >2–5% of the tx value, why wouldn't they migrate to some l2? and then, less demand for blockspace → less fee revenue. if btc l2s pull of, their success pulls value off l1.
picture an actual miner: you’ve got power bills in fiat, hardware that decays, and a spreadsheet. you don’t care if your revenue is “subsidy” or “fees”. you care that each block pays you more than your cost per TH/s per day. if subsidy shrinks faster than fees grow, you unplug. simple.
2024 halving:
block reward went 6.25 → 3.125 btc. hash rate (which is the total "power" used to secure bitcoin) dropped ~11.2% (from ~650 EH/s to ~577 EH/s), then ripped to ~1.1 ZH/s over 7 months.
why?
because price went from ~$60k to $90k .
miners follow price, not “security philosophy”. the network is effectively secured by new buyers bidding the coin up, not by a "mature fee market."
and now let's do some "bitcoin goes down because it's literally attacked" scenario:
at ~1.1 ZH/s, a proper 51% attack is estimated around $6,000,000,000 per week in op-ex, plus maybe $5–20b in hardware. cut hash in half to ~550 EH/s (ol'good bear market more halvings) and weekly op-ex drops toward $1,800,000,000.
that's pennies for state actors.
every halving makes honest mining thinner and attack costs cheaper relative to potential payoff. at some point, a state or cartel can spend a few billion, short btc, nuke confidence with reorgs, and walk away net positive. below certain hash levels it blends into normal cyber budget.
and it gets worse once blocks are paid only with fees.
“selfish mining” = a miner finds a block, hides it, and plays games with timing to earn *more than their fair share* of rewards.
in the old, simple model (only fixed block rewards), you needed about 33.33% of the hashrate to make this profitable.
today, because fees jump around a lot from block to block, the threshold is already closer to ~26%.
in a future world with no subsidy and crazy fee spikes, that threshold drops even further, to roughly 15–23%.
translation: you don’t need “half the network” to take over bitcoin. just one big pool deciding to play dirty.
in 2025, koki kamada and tomoya noda published a paper on bitcoin’s security budget.
to tldr their findings: if you want the network to be secure, the block reward should never fully go to 0. some positive subsidy is always “socially optimal”.
to eli5 their findings: the math says a zero-subsidy bitcoin is bad for long-term security.
right now, fees are only about 1.05% of miner revenue, so they are nowhere close to replacing the security budget that comes from new coins being issued.
so the math literally says "21m cap no bueno". but the 2017 blocksize war proved one thing: bitcoin maxis treat the 21,000,000 cap as religion. hard-forking in perpetual inflation is gg wp.
what is to be done, gentlemen?
There are THREE forbidden questions in crypto:
- Don't ask a
$BTC maxi what happens when block subsidies goes to 0
- Don't ask Toly how much
$SOL he and the foundation have
- Don't ask VCs why we need yet another L1 blockchain
$ETH fixes all these things, btw