~72M USDT frozen by Tether , part of a 120M Tron laundering run (KuCoin, instant exchanges, bridged to BTC/ETH). confirmed the inflow on-chain. h/t @zachxbt
Frozen: TBzrPEsStbZAUx2SBhD4oHz8UW3FX9Ak9W Entity: TA6YHqB2xh5HhfmC7WoLQaWmqq7Vv4zCoQ
🚨 Raydium drained of ~$1.3M (reported by @PeckShieldAlert / Specter)
Attacker funded from KuCoin → bridged Solana to ETH → laundered 810 ETH via Tornado Cash 7 ETH to FixedFloat. Tracing the on-chain flow now. 👇
🚨 SOLVED: ~$1.3M Raydium-AMM exploit on Solana
We traced every hop on-chain
The bug? A FAKE LP token (supply=1) → Withdraw → 100% of the pool drained.
~$1.3M bridged via deBridge → 810 ETH straight into Tornado Cash.
Here's exactly how 🧵👇
🚨 SOLVED: ~$1.3M Raydium-AMM exploit on Solana
We traced every hop on-chain
The bug? A FAKE LP token (supply=1) → Withdraw → 100% of the pool drained.
~$1.3M bridged via deBridge → 810 ETH straight into Tornado Cash.
Here's exactly how 🧵👇
🚨 Raydium drained of ~$1.3M (reported by @PeckShieldAlert / Specter)
Attacker funded from KuCoin → bridged Solana to ETH → laundered 810 ETH via Tornado Cash 7 ETH to FixedFloat. Tracing the on-chain flow now. 👇
Same trick, 4 pools drained:
• 66,836 RAY 893,700 USDC
• 74,720 RAY 5,602 wSOL
• 8,621 RAY 10,692 SRM
• 5,037 RAY dust
Everything funneled into one wallet, then swapped to USDC
How it's prevented:
One line , assert the LP mint passed in == the pool's stored mint. On every withdraw/deposit path. No exceptions.
We catch this class with invariant checks real-time "new mint → Withdraw → vault drained to 0" alerts
- F12 Security Labs
Cash-out:
USDC bridged Solana → Ethereum via deBridge (giveChainId "sol") → 819.9 ETH (~$1.3M) on the attacker's ETH wallet.
Then: 810 ETH into Tornado Cash (9 deposits), 7 ETH to FixedFloat, 0.65 ETH to a fresh EOA
🚨 @syscoin bridge exploit , funds recovered
The ~5B SYS (~$10M) minted via the bridge flaw has been returned to recovery addresses.
On-chain: 999,999,999.99 SYS → recovery address, tx ce9671d…, block 2,253,855. The rest in a second tx.
Bridge stays paused pending the fix
🚨 @MILCplatform bridge exploit , post-mortem.
Root cause: an admin private-key compromise, not a contract bug.
A single EOA held DEFAULT_ADMIN MANAGER on BOTH the BSC and ETH bridges drained them, then handed admin to attacker wallets. ~$161K