Russia & executive power, elites, digital authoritarianism | @laenderanalysen, Russian Analytical Digest | @faburkhardt.bsky.social | Own views
Joined March 2010
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Fabian Burkhardt retweeted
May 24
NEW: Despite mounting pressure at home, Putin believes he can seize the whole of the Donbas by the end of the year. Moscow also no longer believes Trump can force Kyiv into territorial concessions. Our long read on the mood in Russia. With @shaunwalker7
theguardian.com/world/ng-int…
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Fabian Burkhardt retweeted
May 9
The key question people have to address is what is the mechanism of change inside Russia. People / oligarchs / one tower of the Kremlin being frustrated with a man they usually don't even dare name isn't enough. The repressive dial has a long way to go.
May 9
This article by @baunov on the changing mood in Russia and Putin's seeming loss of his special touch is your must-read this weekend carnegieendowment.org/russia…
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Ausführlicher @dekoder_org-Artikel über Nepotismus in Russland, der auch unsere Studie über d. russische Nomenklatura zitiert. Diese zweite Riege ist wichtig für staatliche Herrschaft, funktioniert aber nach anderen Rekrutierungslogiken als die Top-Elite.
dekoder.org/de/gnose/nepotis…
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Fabian Burkhardt retweeted
Mar 12
For more on why you should treat regime functionalism more often as a research question, rather than a generic assumption, see our book:
a.co/d/0hEkKvyv
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Fabian Burkhardt retweeted
Mar 12
Great new report out with granular data on nationalization processes in wartime Russia. They very appropriately do not assume regime functionalism (i.e., 'this is all about Putin staying in power') but actually test it along with other possible explanations for the pattern.
Mar 11
A new Cedar analysis maps wave of wartime nationalisation in RU. Its findings reinforce point I’ve argued for some time: this process reflects the heterogeneity of Russian elites, and as a result its limited controllability, including from the Kremlin.
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cedarus.io/research/asset-re…
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Thank you for the endorsement! This was truly a team effort, and I'm glad our assessments align. 👇
Mar 11
A new Cedar analysis maps wave of wartime nationalisation in RU. Its findings reinforce point I’ve argued for some time: this process reflects the heterogeneity of Russian elites, and as a result its limited controllability, including from the Kremlin.
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cedarus.io/research/asset-re…
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State-controlled pollster VTsIOM has just published Putin's lowest trust rating (open question!) since the full-scale invasion. This is not terrible for Putin so far, but it is getting closer to the all-time low 2021-08. No connection to the incidental video of Putin coughing.
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No conspiracy needed to explain why VTsIOM published the data now. In 2019, they changed from publishing weekly data to monthly data, but it will be crucial to watch if they stop publishing it altogether when things turn really bad. It is still useful to take a closer look at the
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main trends from 2016 to 2026. The direct question obviously yields a very different result: 77.5% of respondents say that they trust Putin (all caveats regarding state-controlled VTsIOM and surveys in authoritarian Russia with war censorship and repression apply).
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The arrest of former Russian Deputy Minister of Defence Ruslan Tsalikov is significant because of his close ties to Shoigu. This is already the fourth former deputy of Shoigu to be arrested. However, it also sheds light on the broader increase in elite repression since 2024.
Mar 6
Business weekly Vedomosti leads on a different story: the arrest of Ruslan Tsalikov, a former first deputy defence minister, whom the paper describes as “one of the closest comrades of [former defence minister] Sergei Shoigu…”
“It’s the first time a former military official of this rank has been accused of creating an organised criminal group,” it reports. The 69-year-old stands accused of embezzling public funds, money laundering and large-scale bribe-taking.
Tsalikov is not, however, the first ally of Sergei Shoigu – sacked by Vladimir Putin as defence minister in 2024 in favour of Andrei Belousov and moved to the Security Council – to be accused of corruption. It appears he could be the latest “victim” in the ongoing purge of Shoigu associates from Russia’s security ranks.
“Of all of the military head’s [Shoigu’s] deputies, Tsalikov was the closest,” the paper quotes a former colleague as saying, noting Tsalikov gave evidence against another deputy defence minister who also came under fire for corruption: Timur Ivanov was later convicted and sent to prison for 13 years.
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Here is a link to the full report of our Russian Elites Lab, in which we tracked criminal cases against deputy ministers. Another report exclusively focused on criminal charges against Russian officials will follow soon. cedarus.io/research/how-puti…
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Fabian Burkhardt retweeted
19 Jun 2025
“When Russia says they’re ‘deporting’ someone, they’re not deporting them back to Ukraine.”
My story on how Putin’s latest attempt to force Russian passports on Ukrainians paves the way for more war crimes in the occupied territories. meduza.io/en/feature/2025/06… @meduza_en
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26 May 2025
Kirienko's empire in the presidential administration to grow: As usual, formal structural changes will follow earlier informal power shifts. Kirienko has already dealt with post-Soviet space (especially the occupied territories) and foreign policy, including hybrid interference.
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26 May 2025
he formally retained his position in the presidential administration. But as a decades-long Putin confidant, Kozak's fate will send an important signal to the elite about how Putin deals with (former) close associates (Kozak has been a key team member
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26 May 2025
since Putin's 2000 presidential campaign).
Reporting on these yet to be confirmed developments in the redistribution of responsibilities from Kozak to Kirienko: vedomosti.ru/politics/articl…
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Fabian Burkhardt retweeted
21 Feb 2025
@fa_burkhardt and I have a new open access paper out in @democ_journal: "Digital ballots, partisan bias: digital authoritarianism and support for internet voting in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine".
www-tandfonline-com.emedien.…
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19 Feb 2025
📢*Four* academic jobs 📢 in political science and related disciplines with a focus on Eastern Europe in our growing Department of Politics at the Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies.
Two postdoc and two doctoral positions, deadline 28 March 2025.
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19 Feb 2025
Link to the postdoc positions:
leibniz-ios.de/en/vacancies-…
Link to the Ph.D. positions:
leibniz-ios.de/en/vacancies-…
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Fabian Burkhardt retweeted
8 Jul 2024
Please support targeted hospital via their official charity foundation
ohmatdytfund.org/donate
8 Jul 2024
Russia has deliberately hit Ohmatdyt, the biggest and narrowly specialized kids hospital in Ukraine. This kids hospital is famous for treating rare deceases and difficult cases from all over Ukraine and abroad. Another war crime committed by Russia
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