#threatreport #MediumCompleteness
Solana FakeFix: 25 Malicious npm and PyPI Packages Lure Developers With Fake Stable Builds | 11-06-2026
Source:
research.jfrog.com/post/sola…
Key details below ↓
🧑💻Actors/Campaigns:
Solana_fakefix
💀Threats:
Typosquatting_technique, Deno_loader,
🎯Victims: Solana developers, Developers, Ci pipelines, Software development, Cryptocurrency
🏭Industry: Financial, Healthcare
📚TTPs:
⚔️Tactics: 2
🛠️Technics: 0
🤖LLM extracted TTPs:`
T1005, T1033, T1036, T1053.003, T1053.005, T1059.001, T1059.006, T1059.007, T1070.004, T1071.001, ...
🧨IOCs:
- File: 24
- Url: 17
- IP: 1
- Path: 3
💽Software: Telegram, ETHERSCAN, Unix crontab, macOS, Windows scheduled task, Windows Registry
🪙Crypto: solana
🔢Algorithms: base58
🔠Functions: Set-ExecutionPolicy, setTimeout, Set-ItemProperty
📜Programming Languages: python, javascript, powershell, typescript
#threatreport:
The Solana FakeFix campaign, identified by JFrog Security Research, involves the distribution of 25 malicious npm and PyPI packages specifically targeting Solana developers, utilizing tactics like typosquatting, fake branding for Solana SDKs, and lifecycle execution hooks to facilitate data theft. These packages aim to extract sensitive information, including wallet keys, cloud credentials, source control tokens, and various environment secrets.
The primary deceptive approach leveraged in this campaign was the promotion of these dangerous packages as compatibility fixes for Solana build issues. The campaigns operated through GitHub issue spamming by user PassWord1337, who posed as a community contributor, effectively targeting developers experiencing dependency challenges. The first stage of the attack required the execution of JavaScript controlled by the attacker during the npm package installation. This executed payload immediately set up a Telegram command-and-control (C2) channel and initiated a search for developer secrets.
For the Python packages, malware was triggered during a standard import process, highlighting differences in execution methods between npm and PyPI. Each type of package shared common payload characteristics, indicating a coordinated effort to breach systems. The later npm variants evolved their attack vector by embedding malicious code within functional-looking Solana JavaScript libraries, enabling them to operate unnoticed while scanning for sensitive information such as Solana keypairs and AWS credentials.
In another facet of the campaign, a CMS-themed loader involved npm packages uploaded by a user named thermonuclear. While not specifically tied to Solana, these packages contained mechanisms for executing remote Windows payloads via PowerShell scripts and JavaScript executed within the context of the Deno runtime. These practices included clandestine installations, dynamic second-stage retrieval of payloads, and attempts to maintain persistence through various Windows functionalities such as scheduled tasks and registry modifications.
The threat actors also leveraged the concept of MEV (miner extractable value) bots to entice victims into providing sensitive credentials under the false promise of passive income. This represents a blend of technical package exploitation and classic phishing tactics.
Remediation steps include uninstalling affected packages, rotating all sensitive credentials, and auditing for potential persistence indicators that could enable attackers to maintain access. Investigation should focus on signs of the Telegram API traffic and other specific IOCs related to the campaign. The complexity of the methods utilized, transitioning from simple backdoors to sophisticated Trojanized libraries, underlines the rapid evolution and increasing sophistication of such cyber threats targeting developer ecosystems.