🚨 CYBER INTELLIGENCE ALERT: 🇮🇶 [UNCONFIRMED / CRITICAL] EXFILTRATION AND GEOLOCATION OF POPULATION DATA — ACTOR CYB3R DRAG0NZ KURDISH (IRAQ)
[STATUS: UNCONFIRMED EXPOSURE OF PII WITH GEOGRAPHIC MAPPING]
A massive campaign of exfiltration and sale of government, civilian, and automotive data from the Republic of Iraq has been detected, attributed to the threat actor "Cyb3r Drag0nz Kurdish." Through processed visual evidence from captured images, it has been confirmed that this actor has structured and put up for sale databases that compromise the privacy of millions of Iraqi citizens, organizing them by family groups and mapping their exact physical location.
Threat Actor: Cyb3r Drag0nz Kurdish.
Primary Affected Regions: Kirkuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Baghdad, Karbala, Basra, among other provinces in Iraq.
Declared Data Volume: More than 200,000 detailed records in the Kirkuk module alone, supplemented by the national database of family allowances.
📂 Technical Analysis of the Evidence and Compromised Infrastructure
The threat actor has fragmented the information into three major vectors of high-fidelity exfiltrated data:
1. Vehicle Registration and Checkpoint Data (Kirkuk and Kurdish Region)
The capture reveals data tables in Arabic associated with vehicle registration, licenses, and local customs/checkpoint records. The visible data schema directly displays:
Owner Information (PII): Full name of the vehicle owner
Vehicle Details: Vehicle type, license plate type, and issuing province (predominantly Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Al-Tamim).
Control Identifiers: License plate numbers, annual serial numbers, receipt folio numbers, specific traffic forms, and distribution committee locations.
2. National Census and Family Distribution Database (2022 Forms)
The screenshot reveals a severe structural compromise. It displays the design of an SQL database environment featuring relational tables categorized by Iraqi governorates. The table creation statements (CREATE TABLE) index sensitive information using the following format:
Modules by Province: Tables titled FAMILY_Baghdad, FAMILY_Erbil, FAMILY_Kirkuk, FAMILY_Basrah, FAMILY_Karbala, FAMILY_Najaf, etc.
The accompanying promotional text explicitly advertises the sale of data forms covering all of Iraq for the year 2022.
3. Geographic Intelligence and Household Mapping Platform (2025 Module)
The screenshots demonstrate that the threat actor possesses a Geographic Information System (GIS) or an interactive web dashboard in Kurdish. On this platform, the exfiltrated population data has been cross-referenced with vector maps showing actual city streets.
Each green dot on the map represents an indexed dwelling. Upon interacting with the nodes, the system displays a side panel containing resident information: full name, ID number, civil registry serial number, and exact home address.
🛡️ Recommended Actions (Investigative and Tactical Levels)
Alerts Regarding Government Credential Reuse: Since the leak exposes the structure of the `LogIns` table from Iraqi family registration systems, warnings should be issued regarding potential secondary brute-force or credential-stuffing attacks targeting institutional portals of Iraqi ministries. Query Interface Isolation (Regional Recommendation): State agencies managing cadastre, census, and vehicle registration systems in the region must immediately audit their web control panels to ensure there are no API key leaks or internet-exposed phpMyAdmin panels that could facilitate the downloading of schemas identical to those described here.
VECERT TOOLS
Strategic Monitoring Tools & Intelligence Platform:
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analyzer.vecert.io
Security Verification & Monitoring:
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monitor.vecert.io
#CyberSecurity 🔐
#ThreatIntelligence 📊
#Iraq #Cyb3rDrag0nzKurdish #DataBreach 📁
#PII #GeolocatedLeaks #Kirkuk #Sulaymaniyah #VECERT 🏢