Is moral advice more compelling if it includes an argument? What if it's from an #AI?
Advice strongly influenced decisions to sacrifice-one-to-save-five, regardless of whether advice
- came from #chatGPT (3.5).
- included an argument.
doi.org/10.1007/s43681-026-0…#xPhi#ethics#edu
ALT "Fig. 2 Influence of advice on moral judgment. The figure plots the proportions, along with the 95% confidence intervals, of subjects who find sacrificing one person the right thing to do after receiving advice. The numbers of observations figure above the boxes"
ALT "Fig. 3 Perceived moral authority and plausibility of advice among subjects who follow advice. The figure plots the mean ratings and standard errors of the mean as well as the number of subjects at the bottom of each bar"
ALT "Fig. 1 Advice by ChatGPT against sacrificing one life to save five with an argument (top) and without (bottom). Advice by moral advisor looked identical except that the icons on the left and the like/dislike buttons on the right were cut off"
Can we assume research participants accept the stipulations of vignettes?
This paper reports that moral dilemma decisions varied according to how much people seemed to believe stipulations (e.g., that intervening would actually save five people).
doi.org/10.1017/S19302975000…#xPhi
There are three new calls on the X-Phi Blog: »6th European Experimental Philosophy Conference«, »Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Linguistic Justice«, and »The Armchair on Trial«. Read more on xphi.net! #philosophy#xphi#experimentalphilosophy
ALT Figure 1. "Responses showed the expected baseline patterns across dilemmas. The determinism manipulation reduced willingness to intervene in the Spur dilemma (p = 0.0385, fewer participants pulled the switch) and reduced willingness to help in the Singer scenario (p = 0.0261), but had no detectable effect on Footbridge judgments (p = 0.783)."
To celebrate the launch of the xphi-journal and kick-off our talk series, we are happy to invite everyone to this talk by Edouard Machery. Zoom-link below.
A new xphi paper on truth; serious qs remain. Eg truthfulness in this ppr could easily be interpreted by ps as usefulness. Given what I report in my 2017, it’s clear that ppl have strong views re truth’s usefulness. Also why entangle truth with truthfulness AND truth relativism.
Beautiful experimental philosophy paper on what people ordinarily mean when they say that a statement is “true”
Turns out it’s not always about corresponding correctly to the facts. Sometimes it’s more closely related to a moral ideal of “truthfulness”
philarchive.org/archive/ZYGT…
Is solipsism measurable?
Seven studies developed a self-report scale of how much one doubts that others exist (beyond one's own mind).
It correlated with loneliness, social disconnection, aggression, and problematic gaming.
doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2025.…#xPhi#psychometrics.#psych
Thousands of people in a dozen countries thought reflective reasoning was usually the best way to make a decision in ordinary dilemmas.
Runners up were intuition, friends' advice, and the wisdom of a crowd (in that order).
doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2025.13…#cogSci#epistemology#xPhi
ALT About the "everyday dilemmas".
ALT Descriptive statistics about the data.
ALT The descriptions of intuition, deliberation, friends' advice, and wisdom of a crowd.
Might the concept of "good judgment" vary by framing or social roles?
Five studies of four nations (🇺🇸🇨🇦🇬🇧🇨🇳) found some words and roles were more associated with "rational" than "reasonable" (and vice versa).
doi.org/10.1162/opmi.a.24#CogSci#xPhi#linguistics#dataViz
ALT Descriptive statistics about the samples
ALT "Figure 1. Top ten most frequent co-occurrence of Adjectives with ‘rational’ (blue) and ‘reasonable’ (orange) when asked to describe most important characteristics of a person showing sound judgment (Study 1a) / good judgment in a challenging situation (Study 1b). Adjectives are ordered from those most associated with ‘rational’ to those with ‘reasonable.’ Dumbbell nodes represent the percentage of each adjective’s co-occurrence relative to the sum of independent occurrences of each pair of terms."
ALT "Figure 2. Qualities attributed to rational and reasonable persons in Study 1. Color-coded adjectives reflect Analytical, Moral, and Inner Fortitude items (Study 1a)/Agency and Communion factors (Study 1b). Top panels: Estimates from linear mixed model with responses to all characteristics nested in participants, with target order (rational vs. reasonable) as a covariate and false discovery rate correction for multiple testing. Dashed vertical line delineates effects 1 unit above midpoint of the 1–7 scale in Study 1a / half a unit above the midpoint of the 1–5 scale in Study 1b. Bottom panels: Pearson’s correlations and 95% CIs of average scores across items making up each factor. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05."
ALT "Figure 3. Top Panel: Preference proportions for reasonable vs. rational agents in social roles. Displays proportions (with 95% CI) derived from logits in generalized mixed models. The dashed line at .50 indicates parity; above this, preference leans towards reasonable agents, and below, towards rational agents. Bottom Panel: Necessity ratings for rationality and reasonableness by role (1–5 rating scale). Shows estimated means and 95% CI. Ratings indicate moderate to high necessity (3–4) for both rationality and reasonableness across rule-based (on the right) and holistic roles (on the left)."
FYI: XPRAG Wine Gatherings: We’re excited to invite you to a special XPRAG Wine Gathering, where the XPRAG and XPhi communities come together! Experimental Pragmatics and Experimental Philosophy have long shared similar journeys—and now, we have the… dlvr.it/TN5FSX
There’s a new announcement on the X-Phi Blog: On Tuesday, Nicole Gotzner and Kevin Reuter will give a talk about »Intentionality and Discrimination« on Zoom. Find out more: xphi.net/2025/08/31/talk-int…#philosophy#xphi
There is some news on the X-Phi Blog, including a call for a conference on »Law’s Many Users« as well as announcements for a workshop and a hackathon on »Data-Driven Methods for Philosophy«! Take a look: xphi.net/#philosophy#xphi
ALT Byrd, N. (2025). Reflection-Philosophy Order Effects and Correlations Across Samples. Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaf015
ALT Byrd, N. (2025). Reflection-Philosophy Order Effects and Correlations Across Samples. Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaf015
ALT Maćkiewicz, B., Kuś, K., Zaręba, M., & Paprzycka-Hausman, K. (2025). Does reflection reduce the epistemic side-effect effect? A new challenge to error accounts. Mind & Language. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12558
ALT Maćkiewicz, B., Kuś, K., Zaręba, M., & Paprzycka-Hausman, K. (2025). Does reflection reduce the epistemic side-effect effect? A new challenge to error accounts. Mind & Language. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12558
I am excited to announce that my new article “Reviewing the Extended Mind Theory: Theoretical Insights and the Role of
Experimental Philosophy in Understanding Cognitive Boundaries” is out🎉
you can find here 👉🏻 dergipark.org.tr/tr/download…#theextendedmindtheory#xphi
ALT First, argument map training never made one group outperform another on any assignment.
Second, improvement was similar between the argument mapping group and the waitlist controls.
So — BIG PICTURE — I didn't detect any obvious benefit of argument map training above and beyond controlled factors.