5/5 No regulator proved that money was laundered through Silvergate. No regulator proved that fraud occurred. No regulator proved that our AML controls failed. The SEC case was a disclosure theory. Our CFO contested it and did not settle. Our CAO’s sworn bankruptcy testimony states plainly: Silvergate had stabilized by early 2023, met capital requirements, and could have continued operating. It was two joint statements from the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and OCC that Silvergate’s own CAO cited in sworn bankruptcy testimony as the regulatory signals that made the bank’s business model untenable. We were a victim of FTX’s fraud. Not a participant in it. The structural questions this raises go beyond Silvergate. When activist short sellers can lobby regulators privately, without disclosure, while profiting publicly from the response, and shareholders absorb the cost of proceedings that prove nothing, that is a market structure problem worth talking about seriously. #Banking #FinancialRegulation #ShortSelling #Silvergate #OperationChokepoint #MarketStructure #InvestorProtection

5/5 Faced with these options, and advised by wise counsel that a pound of flesh would be taken regardless, I chose to settle so I could move forward. But the process itself is designed to apply maximum pressure, and the human costs are real. I was personally de-banked and had credit lines summarily closed—an aggressive tactic used to disrupt daily life and force compliance. Furthermore, while the SEC will no longer enforce the silence, I still live with the structural consequences of this enforcement action. I bear the burden of a significant financial penalty paid as part of the settlement, alongside ongoing, very real limitations to my professional trajectory and executive options. The allegations leveled against me were a side story to a larger political agenda. I am incredibly proud of the resilience, integrity, and operational execution our team demonstrated during a true banking crisis. I am glad the right to speak the truth has finally been restored, but we must continue to talk about the long-term professional and personal toll exacted on individuals by regulation through enforcement. #Banking #RiskManagement #CorporateGovernance #SEC #FirstAmendment #FinTech #Debanking

3/5 The risk of a deposit run is a feature—not a bug—of a fractionalized banking system. Surviving one is proof of robust risk management. In fact, by the beginning of Q1 2023, we had successfully restructured the business with appropriate capital levels and a right-sized workforce to safely operate a smaller, more focused institution. We did not wind down because of the run or the market volatility. We ultimately chose a responsible, voluntary wind-down because the broader administrative and regulatory pressure levied against the digital asset industry made operating a viable business impossible.