Science, Security, Sports.
Joined October 2013
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100 Photos and videos
Feb 19
(1/x) Out this week - our new report: "Mobile Connected UAVs in Conflict” info.enea.com/Riders-on-the-… . This is the first report to cover #mobilenetworks combat drones. Ukraine's Operation #Spiderweb showed the potential of this connection, but was it a once-off, or a future trend?
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Feb 19
(6/x) Ukraine is also grappling how best to deal with the threat. Even yesterday, reports discuss changing SIM card sales and specific data disabling, due to Russian mobile controlled drones being dropped by 'mothership' drones behind Ukrainian lines united24media.com/latest-new…
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Feb 19
(7/x) But all societies will need to have defences in this area. More details in the report - enea.com/insights/riders-on-… . This is a rapid area - within last week the EU & China have both issued reports or guidelines at how telecom operators can detect UAVs. Expect this to continue
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16 Jul 2025
The 'wild west' of #SS7 security
Surveillance companies are increasingly using clever encoding to try to bypass signaling firewalls — here's new research showing how the latest attack works:
enea.com/insights/the-good-t…
@EneaAB @josephfcox @rj_gallagher @campuscodi @lorenzofb
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26 Sep 2024
I'll be explaining how we got here, how attackers and defenders have evolved and the future of securing mobile networks.
virusbulletin.com/conference…
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24 Sep 2024
Happy to have contributed to this mobile phone security episode with @veritasium. Its a great introduction to #ss7 and its security risks. Plus kudos to @yodresh for his work.
22 Sep 2024
New video! I hacked @LinusTech to expose the vulnerability in our phone system youtube.com/watch?v=wVyu7NB7…
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25 Apr 2024
New #4G/#5G #cybersecurity research released today. @nerfux breaks down #SCTP 'quantum' insertion attacks on telecom networks:
enea.com/insights/quantum-of…
In the past, mobile network security has focused a lot on edge protection, in the future we will need to look inward as well.
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7 Mar 2024
Thanks to @tomwithington and @arm_magazine for featuring our new "Location Tracking on the Battlefield" report.
Check out the article in this month's edition!⬇️
armadainternational.com/2024…
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6 Mar 2024
10/12
2nd, Russia has reportedly done this before. This matches the method that Ukraine accused Russia of using in 2014 , as a result by publishing this new recording they would not have been 'burning' any secret hacks.
wired.com/2016/04/the-critic…
enea.com/insights/russia-ukr…
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6 Mar 2024
11/12
Lastly, while SS7 security has improved greatly since then, some elements of this would have made it more likely to succeed.
The targeting of an outbound roamer for example is more likely to succeed that a subscriber at home.
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6 Mar 2024
12/12
Note this is one *possible* way it could have happened, other methods like a local 3G/4G radio voice interception using Fake Base Stations are possible, but they would require a SS7 link. 2G radio interception may also be possible although more likely to be noticed
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6 Mar 2024
8/12
The call is then directed to the Russian PBX/listener. At this point, a new call is initiated to the webex conference number, with the original German mobile being spoofed, and is sent to the webex number. The Russian device then acts as a MITM and the call is recorded
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6 Mar 2024
9/12
This matches was occurred as the German roamer to Singapore is the first person that we hear. They get intro-ed/added to the conference by another. The recording can only happen with his call.
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6 Mar 2024
6/12
The webex starts, and the German roamer attempts to dial to it (or to an interim number, the interception method is the same).
However, the Singapore network now checks the Russian ‘billing platform’, via a CAMEL IDP command. This is to see whether the call should go ahead
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6 Mar 2024
7/12
The Russian ‘billing platform’ says the call should go ahead, but also should be redirected to a different number. This number is a Russian listening device. most likely a PBX.
This information is relayed back to Singapore network in a CAMEL CONNECT command
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6 Mar 2024
1/12
It has been confirmed that the #Taurus interception was done via “a non-secure line”. Below is my opinion of one way in which it *might* have been done, taking into account the situation and #Russia's previous history.
Essentially it involves using #SS7 interception.
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6 Mar 2024
5/12
Now the attack. First, Russia would modify the billing platform info (gsmSCF address) stored for the German roamer, in the Singapore network.
This is done via a SS7 ISD command (with target's IMSI or MSISDN), from a GT (address) in the German network to a GT they control
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