A few days ago I was at an event organized by MITS in Kyiv, where the topic was the “drone wall” and whether Russian UAVs could shift Europe’s front line. Ironic question — can you shift what doesn’t exist. I tried to unpack the core problem: Europe’s lack of preparation for the imminent war Russia might start against European countries. So the title of my thought: Europe is playing at war, not preparing for it. Europe speaks the language of progress but thinks in the language of comfort. Here war has become a tech show, where every new buzzword — “game-changer”, “AI”, “drone revolution” — creates an opiate sense of control, replacing real preparation for the coming war Russia may begin by invading the Baltic states. Unfortunately, because of a lack of real combat experience, generals, defence ministers, politicians (Ukrainians included, regrettably) have forgotten the main thing — equipment does not fight on its own. A drone, a rifle, a tank, a fighter, a radar station, a truck — these are only tools with specific tasks. An army is not a pile of metal and not merely a crowd of highly trained soldiers. An army is a structure that moves as one: C4ISR, logistics, infantry, artillery, intelligence, medicine, communications. Everything begins with the principles of war — they are the constant on which the art of war is built; they should be reminded to European generals as insistently as we constantly remind Ukrainian (Soviet-trained) commanders. Objective — a clearly defined end state. C4ISR must provide a single picture and clear tasks; without an objective all tools are useless. Offensive — action must seize the initiative; defense must be active. Infantry and artillery cannot wait for long data collection cycles; they act on targets provided by intelligence and on C4ISR decisions. Mass — concentrate fire and resources at the decisive point. Logistics and ammunition stocks allow you to “build up” fire where it will matter most. Economy of Force — allocate resources with priority to what matters. Battle-testing and right procurement priorities prevent wasting scarce resources on “show projects”. Maneuver — use movement to create favorable force ratios. Infantry and armor, combined with intelligence and EW, create opportunities to bypass or break the enemy’s defenses. Unity of Command (C2) — one plan, coordinated action. C2 inside C4ISR guarantees that all elements act to a single intent, not to separate instructions. Security — protection from enemy reconnaissance and strikes; protect supply chains and comms. EW/cyber and dispersed logistics infrastructure make the system survivable. Surprise — strike where and when the enemy does not expect it. Quality intelligence plus a fast decision cycle in C4ISR deliver tactical advantage. Simplicity — plans must be understandable and executable in chaos. Training, NCO skills and standardized SOPs make tactics work even when comms fail. Sustainability / Perseverance — the ability to endure prolonged pressure and to recover. Strategic stocks, MRO, medicine and mobilization capacity are what give a campaign long legs. Without this connectivity, everything else is just shards of technical pride. If there is no system, even the best technology does not unite an army — it merely fragments it into pieces, each living in its own illusion of strength. Today Europe pours billions into startups that have no grounding and no realistic chance of success. Their founders are “veterans” of peacekeeping missions, not modern high-intensity war. They build pretty prototypes that fail field tests. Stark Defence failed all strikes; Watchkeeper fell on its own wings. This is not merely technical malfunction — it is a diagnosis of a system where money has replaced experience. Stark raised over $100 million in venture capital, including investment tied to Peter Thiel, and none of its four test strikes hit their targets. Watchkeeper cost British taxpayers more than £1 billion, and after years of development became a symbol of expensive impotence: drones crashed before they could fight. Money creates the illusion of understanding war, but it cannot substitute for those who have seen it up close. When technology is born without front-line experience, it becomes a fine concept that dies on first contact with reality. Finland is the exception. It has over 900,000 reservists, of whom 280,000 can be mobilized immediately. Under the Comprehensive Defence 2035 plan the state is deploying new ammunition and fuel stocks and modernizing shelters along the eastern border, while updating its system of field fortifications. The purchase of 64 F-35A fighters, joint production of Patria 6×6APCs and over 2,000 exercises a year — this is not a show, it is practical preparation for war. Finland does not build “drone walls” for the news — it builds real territorial defence plans: stocks, roads, reserves, mobilization lists. For them war is not a concept, it is an engineering task already calculated by the hour. And Europe, even if in theory it were to receive the best weapons and the best army, would still lack the most important thing — officers who know how to fight this war. Not a museum war, not a simulation — but a modern, chaotic, dynamic war. That experience exists — among Ukrainian officers. And Europe is now losing the chance not merely to learn from them, but to save itself from future defeat. Investment should go not into yet another prototype, but into people who know what real war looks like. That is the most profitable investment — and the only one that makes sense. Europe is turning its attention to Ukrainian officers — chiefly those bearing high ranks: generals, advisors, former chiefs of staff. It is convenient: they speak a familiar language — about strategy, plans, funding. But most of them met the war away from the frontline, in offices. In 2014 many were colonels who had not seen the real front line. Their experience is administrative, not combat. And this paradox creates the false impression that experience is being taken into account. While Europe listens to generals instead of those who actually fought, it repeats the old mistake: learning from theorists when living practitioners are right next to it. Concepts like a “drone wall” will not save you if they are not backed by a system that can see, think and act. Any wall without experience of use, without protection and countermeasures, is just decoration. Any innovation without war is just noise. Victory will not go to the side with the most technology, but to the side that remembers the army is not a set of devices, but a way of thinking that turns chaos into order. Whoever first stops playing at war — and starts preparing for it — will win. It is a pity that the mistakes of the foolish and the show-loving will bring additional suffering and the deaths of innocent civilians.

Two years ago we imported communication systems. Today global investors back Ukrainian innovation. Teletactica raised $1.5 million from @mitscapital and GreenFlag through Brave1. Watch their story!