New post on EthResear.ch! Open vs. Sealed: Auction Format Choice for Maximal Extractable Value By: - 🔗 ethresear.ch/t/24454 Highlights: - MEV extracted values are extremely concentrated in a heavy right tail: the top 1% of transactions produce 68% of total revenue (Gini ≈ 0.933), so auction design for high-value events dominates overall revenue outcomes. - Competition intensity differs widely by MEV type (using bribe % as a proxy): sandwiches are near-perfectly competitive (~95% bribe), while naked arbitrage and liquidations leave much more surplus with searchers (~67–68%), implying different effective bidder counts across categories. - Revenue equivalence breaks under affiliated (correlated) valuations; modeling affiliation via a Gaussian common factor yields the linkage-principle ranking: English and second-price sealed-bid (SPSB) generate strictly higher expected revenue than first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) and Dutch for all tested (n, ρ) cells with ρ > 0. - Quantitatively, at moderate affiliation (ρ = 0.5) English/SPSB out-earn FPSB/Dutch by about 14–28% (largest for small n, up to ~30% when n is small), translating to an estimated $10–18M of foregone revenue over the sample period when applied to observed bribe totals. - All-pay auctions are a poor choice in MEV settings once affiliation is considered: FPSB revenues exceed all-pay by roughly 40–120%; additionally, at large n and high ρ, expected revenue can become non-monotonic in ρ (peaking then declining) because near-perfect correlation collapses the order-statistic spread that drives competitive payments. ELI5: Ethereum has “MEV opportunities” (like small profit chances from ordering transactions) that builders sell to searchers using auctions. This paper asks: which kind of auction makes builders earn the most money? The key idea is that searchers’ values are often related (if it’s valuable to one bot, it’s probably valuable to others too). When values are related, open/truth-revealing auctions (like an English auction or a second-price auction) usually make the seller more money than sealed/strategic-shading auctions (like first-price or Dutch). The authors also show MEV money is extremely lopsided: a tiny fraction of transactions produce most of the revenue, so choosing the best auction for those rare big ones matters a lot.

1// We're proud to announce TOOL Testnet launch!

1// We're proud to announce TOOL Testnet launch!

1// We're proud to announce TOOL Testnet launch!

🔥 @nuconstruct TOOL Testnet is live! Super excited to see this come to life, and even more excited to be part of it! At Stakely, we're supporting the launch through Hoodi with 1000 Ethereum genesis vals and 1000 Lido vals Top builders doing big things ⚒️

1// We're proud to announce TOOL Testnet launch!

1// We're proud to announce TOOL Testnet launch!

1// We're proud to announce TOOL Testnet launch!

1// We're proud to announce TOOL Testnet launch!

1// We're proud to announce TOOL Testnet launch!

1// We're proud to announce TOOL Testnet launch!

1// We're proud to announce TOOL Testnet launch!

1// We're proud to announce TOOL Testnet launch!

Our next community call will be hosted on Discord: Wed 27 August @ 3pm UTC We'll chat with @nuconstruct about decentralised Ethereum scaling, & how node operators on Hoodi can participate Download the @poapxyz Home App & grab a free POAP when you join the call Link below 👇

Blockworks exclusive: Meet TOOL, a new system promising 1-second Ethereum trades — no rollups, no forks blockworks.co/news/tool-midd…