Your atypical security enthusiast | DFIR | Threat Hunting | Detection Eng | Insider Threat | Making content at The Blue Team Village | Opinions are my own.

Joined January 2013
85 Photos and videos
14 Apr 2025
There are individuals that you meet in your life that leave a mark, not just for their kindness & care, but for their humbleness & friendship. @d0ublebind is such individual and more! Please consider donating and send him lots of love ❤️ gofundme.com/f/aarons-flight… #FuckCancer
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14 Dec 2024
If you are looking for very skillful, knowledgeable, and great human beings for your Red Team, please consider @Salbei_ and @Micheal_merrill I worked with them for many years and with confidence can say that your team will greatly improve with them!
12 Dec 2024
Replying to @_MG_
Some of the people who are looking include @Salbei_ & @Micheal_merrill I’m also happy to forward leads to the team
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16 Sep 2024
Last year we used JuiceShop with a twist during our CTF. If you want to learn more about bug bounty and app security Juice Shop is a fun way to get started!
Join the shared User Day of @owasp #DSOMM and #JuiceShop on Sep 25th, the day before @appsecusa San Francisco 2024! The agenda includes intros, demos, workshops and even a live CTF: owasp.org/www-project-juice-… Register now on eventbrite.com/e/owasp-globa… because seats are very limited!
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5 Sep 2024
This, get familiar with your logs and how they can help you find this much more practical and likely scenario. Then, have a documented plan on how to respond and mitigate!
5 Sep 2024
For anyone worrying about this, I’d like to hear how you were already handling a near identical attack that didn’t require this vuln: - steal Yubikey - login - returns key WITHOUT cloning it, because 1 session is enough for most objectives Same attack flow. If that wasn’t already part of your threat model, why is this? If it was part of your threat model, how do your existing defenses not already handle the vuln? (I can think of a few, but none that apply to most of the people who are concerned) This should change very little for most people.
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11 Jan 2024
Great use of the word likely in context of an investigation for which data may not be conclusive. When not fully sure, likely is a good word to choose. Their 2nd tweet tells the story, it was 2FA, the lack of it, plus “likely” an easy to guess password… Kudos for the report!
We have finished our investigation into last week's Mandiant X account takeover and determined it was likely a brute force password attack, limited to this single account.
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11 Jan 2024
Just in case, not bashing on them. Things happen and we all learn from them. But it was a good opportunity to highlight the choice of words on the tweet. The report released lacks the details many us were probably expecting, but is short and on point for what it is.
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21 Nov 2023
If anyone is looking for an internship for next summer our security engineering team (Paranoids Engineering) has a spot open. Ideal candidate has software engineering experience, interest in security, experience with Go and/or Rust. Please DM for info and share
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9 Nov 2023
What makes our CTF different? You play the role of an IR consultant responding to a breach. You get access to host telemetry via a SIEM of your choice (graylog, elastic or splunk) Net telemetry via Arkime or pcaps Security Onion provides an easier path 4 the less experienced
Call for Red Team Volunteers:  We are expanding hands-on content and working on a new CTF for @defcon 32. If you are an experienced Red Teamer, passionate about helping others, and would like to help, please reach out! #redteam #cybersecurity docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1F…
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9 Nov 2023
Just as IRL, tools are not always working, the indexed telemetry wasn’t always properly ingested. You will have access to velociraptor data, some of which was collected incorrectly… You need to leverage your IR skills & find ways to overcome these & other obstacles to win!
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9 Nov 2023
We designed the CTF for you to choose your own adventure! Ultimately you are in charge of the path you want to pursue, but keep in mind, some paths may have some unwanted penalties, or immediate benefits! See you @defcon 32!
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9 Nov 2023
We have ambitious goals. Our CTFs are based on real events and APTs. We need your help to accomplish our goals and have an immersive CTF for folks of all skill levels. Reach out if you have any questions! Please apply asap!
Call for Red Team Volunteers:  We are expanding hands-on content and working on a new CTF for @defcon 32. If you are an experienced Red Teamer, passionate about helping others, and would like to help, please reach out! #redteam #cybersecurity docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1F…
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2 Nov 2023
Our Platform Security team is looking for a new sr. security engineer. Come work with us! Role is remote. linkedin.com/jobs/view/37553… (workday is down right now) ouryahoo.wd5.myworkdayjobs.c… Happy to provide referrals to anyone I know
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13 Oct 2023
Back in 2021 @coolestcatiknow @1njection @CptOfEvilMinion @TilottamaSanyal and I, presented a 2 day MacOS workshop @defcon @BlueTeamVillage on Emulating & Threat Hunting APT 32: OceanLotus. The workshop was kept private until today. You can play along: huntapples.com

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13 Oct 2023
To my knowledge this was the first MacOS Threat Hunting workshop that attempted to show how to properly EMULATE an adversary. Next week datasets will be uploaded for you to load into the SIEM of your choose pcaps Would you like to see a similar workshop? If so, for what APT?
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23 Sep 2023
@MITREengenuity evaluation results are valuable, & while it is true many vendors scored a 100% detection rate, let's keep in mind that the tests performed are emulating a particular actor, primarily on Windows, on specific OS versions… 1/x
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23 Sep 2023
…In this regard, Mitre is taking the time to EMULATE an actor. The attention to detail required is available to you on their results and documentation. This information is a must for folks conducting threat hunting, detection engineering, or purple teaming. 7/x
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23 Sep 2023
…Use the information to learn how to EMULATE an actor and leverage the data to improve your cyber defense program. Use the information to challenge your vendors' marketing nonsense! <end>
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