ALT Monthly U.S.-Mexico Border Cocaine Seizures Oct-17 Nov-17 Dec-17 Jan-18 Feb-18 Mar-18 Apr-18 May-18 Jun-18 Jul-18 Aug-18 Sep-18 Oct-18 Nov-18 Dec-18 Jan-19 Feb-19 Mar-19 Apr-19 May-19 Jun-19 Jul-19 Aug-19 Sep-19 Oct-19 Nov-19 Dec-19 Jan-20 Feb-20 Mar-20 Apr-20 May-20 Jun-20 Jul-20 Aug-20 Sep-20 Oct-20 Nov-20 Dec-20 Jan-21 Feb-21 Mar-21 Apr-21 May-21 Jun-21 Jul-21 Aug-21 Sep-21 Oct-21 Nov-21 Dec-21 Jan-22 Feb-22 Mar-22 Apr-22 May-22 Jun-22 Jul-22 Aug-22 Sep-22 Oct-22 Nov-22 Dec-22 Jan-23 Feb-23 Mar-23 Apr-23 May-23 Jun-23 Jul-23 Aug-23 Sep-23 Oct-23 Nov-23 Dec-23 Jan-24 Feb-24 Mar-24 Apr-24 May-24 Jun-24 Jul-24 Aug-24 Sep-24 Oct-24 Nov-24 Dec-24 Jan-25 Feb-25 Mar-25 Apr-25 May-25 Jun-25 Jul-25 Aug-25 Sep-25 Oct-25 Nov-25 Dec-25 At the Ports of Entry 1852 2516 1493 1738 1453 2133 1293 1285 1172 844 2742 1423 2205 1893 1106 1652 1525 1681 1158 1638 1119 1531 2342 1676 1302 1878 980 1183 1433 708 690 1103 1105 864 1199 2353 3968 2294 1330 1971 2038 1381 1990 1632 1235 1932 1910 1292 1582

ALT (c) Presidential executive power as Commander-in-Chief; limitation The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces. The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations.

ALT "Kilmar Armando Abrego Garcia respectfully submits this supplemental notice to provide the Court with additional facts relevant to his motion to dismiss for vindictive and selective prosecution. Recent developments in Mr. Abrego’s habeas case before Judge Xinis, concerning the government’s misrepresentations about whether Costa Rica would accept Mr. Abrego upon his removal, make crystal clear that the government is willing to mislead the courts and defy court orders intended to shed light on its conduct, all in service of punishing Mr. Abrego. This provides further proof—if any were needed—of the government’s vindictiveness toward Mr. Abrego and underscores the need for discovery into the motivations of the high-level officials who initiated this prosecution and are ultimately responsible for the government’s misrepresentations regarding Mr. Abrego’s third-country removal."