Finally publishing this 🧠 dump of a proposal: research.allo.capital/t/pan-…

technofeudalism is here. the digital economy stopped being a market. it became a set of platforms (uber, amazon, google, openai) that extract rent from every transaction crossing them. you don't own a shop on main street anymore. you rent one from airbnb at 15%, and the rules change tomorrow if they want. if the platform is the economy, the platform owner is the lord. everyone else is a tenant. small business cannot out-compete a network. workers cannot bargain against an algorithm. ai is about to make tenant-labor optional too. technofeudalism is just math. networks generate n² value between users. once one hits ~10% of tam, takeoff velocity is irreversible. nobody starts a second uber. the railroad and telegraph and pipeline monopolies of the 1800s are now apps, and they consolidate faster because the marginal cost of adding a country is zero. the evidence: - thiel, 2014: "competition is for losers." - the us top 10 by market cap is almost entirely platform plays. - post-reagan antitrust has been mostly dormant. - ai capex is concentrating in a handful of firms. so what do we do? markets and democracies both rely on voluntarism plus distributed power. we are losing both. the response has to restore at least one. three threads worth pulling: 1. governance of networks that isn't "one dude." we govern nation states (badly) and firms (worse). we do not yet know how to govern a network. that is the open design space. 2. alternatives to the network, not a war against it. you cannot out-network the network. you can build commons-based infrastructure where the rent flows back to contributors instead of a holding company. 3. third spaces and local economies. when the global network goes feudal, the move is local sovereignty. boulder, not silicon valley. neighbors you can name, not user ids. the window for any of this is open right now. it is closing.

While Opus' current lobotomization is likely due to the role out of the 4.7 series, I have an alternative theory: What if everyone using Caveman - combined with Claude's self improving shadow-RL - has just scrambled the neural network vectors back 10's of thousand of years in IQ

I'm running for US Congress. Seriously. Imagine common sense crypto policy and regulation, aligned with American dynamism. Check out our list of new Crypto Policies we will support, linked below. x.com/va_joe/status/20422398…

what if ethereum strengthened local communities? ethereum localism starts with a simple premise: a global, permissionless network should still care about place governance/funding optimized for watersheds, in city councils, in food systems, in REAL local economies what if we could achieve open source coordination that's rooted in soil?

one simple trick to make claude write better tests (especially solidity): have it read the @MolochDAO testing guide I wrote 7 years ago thank me later 👹 github.com/MolochVentures/mo…

Working on isolated Agent-as-a-Service @openclaw instances and building my clawrmy in the process 🦞

We need more DAOs - but different and better DAOs. The original drive to build Ethereum was heavily inspired by decentralized autonomous organizations: systems of code and rules that lived on decentralized networks that could manage resources and direct activity, more efficiently and more robustly than traditional governments and corporations could. Since then, the concept of DAOs has migrated to essentially referring to a treasury controlled by token holder voting - a design which "works", hence why it got copied so much, but a design which is inefficient, vulnerable to capture, and fails utterly at the goal of mitigating the weaknesses of human politics. As a result, many have become cynical about DAOs. But we need DAOs. * We need DAOs to create better oracles. Today, decentralized stablecoins, prediction markets, and other basic building blocks of defi are built on oracle designs that we are not satisfied with. If the oracle is token based, whales can manipulate the answer on a subjective issue and it becomes difficult to counteract them. Fundamentally, a token-based oracle cannot have a cost of attack higher than its market cap, which in turn means it cannot secure assets without extracting rent higher than the discount rate. And if the oracle uses human curation, then it's not very decentralized. The problem here is not greed. The problem is that we have bad oracle designs, we need better ones, and bootstrapping them is not just a technical problem but also a social problem. * We need DAOs for onchain dispute resolution, a necessary component of many types of more advanced smart contract use cases (eg. insurance). This is the same type of problem as price oracles, but even more subjective, and so even harder to get right. * We need DAOs to maintain lists. This includes: lists of applications known to be secure or not scams, lists of canonical interfaces, lists of token contract addresses, and much more. * We need DAOs to get projects off the ground quickly. If you have a group of people, who all want something done and are willing to contribute some funds (perhaps in exchange for benefits), then how do you manage this, especially if the task is too short-duration for legal entities to be worth it? * We need DAOs to do long-term project maintenance. If the original team of a project disappears, how can a community keep going, and how can new people coming in get the funding they need? One framework that I use to analyze this is "convex vs concave" from vitalik.eth.limo/general/202… . If the DAO is solving a concave problem, then it is in an environment where, if faced with two possible courses of action, a compromise is better than a coin flip. Hence, you want systems that maximize robustness by averaging (or rather, medianing) in input from many sources, and protect against capture and financial attacks. If the DAO is solving a convex problem, then you want the ability to make decisive choices and follow through on them. In this case, leaders can be good, and the job of the decentralized process should be to keep the leaders in check. For all of this to work, we need to solve two problems: privacy, and decision fatigue. Without privacy, governance becomes a social game (see vitalik.eth.limo/general/202… ). And if people have to make decisions every week, for the first month you see excited participation, but over time willingness to participate, and even to stay informed, declines. I see modern technology as opening the door to a renaissance here. Specifically: * ZK (and in some cases MPC/FHE, though these should be used only when ZK along cannot solve the problem) for privacy * AI to solve decision fatigue * Consensus-finding communication tools (like pol.is, but going further) AI must be used carefully: we must *not* put full-size deepseek (or worse, GPT 5.2) in charge of a DAO and call it a day. Rather, AI must be put in thoughtfully, as something that scales and enhances human intention and judgement, rather than replacing it. This could be done at DAO level (eg. see how deepfunding.org/ works), or at individual level (user-controlled local LLMs that vote on their behalf). It is important to think about the "DAO stack" as also including the communication layer, hence the need for forums and platforms specially designed for the purpose. A multisig plus well-designed consensus-finding tools can easily beat idealized collusion-resistant quadratic funding plus crypto twitter. But in all cases, we need new designs. Projects that need new oracles and want to build their own should see that as 50% of their job, not 10%. Projects working on new governance designs should build with ZK and AI in mind, and they should treat the communication layer as 50% of their job, not 10%. This is how we can ensure the decentralization and robustness of the Ethereum base layer also applies to the world that gets built on top.

We have 3 trillion hours wasted scrolling that could become 'investments' into solving the many challenges each community faces. So many startups die unsuported and many problems that are not venture-backable are left unaddressed. We can empower communities at scale when we can offer a frictionless and effective system for people to start projects, leverage sweat equity contributions from their community, and fairly govern the value created. People currently lack the mechanisms to enable it: - Sense making to define problems where is tricky - Managing work across fluid groups is cumbersome - Valuing work is prone to conflict and too time-consuming to do in small pieces - Rewarding work requires paying lawyers and setting ESOPs, excluding freelancers - Governing the collective is impossible without proper tooling past 5-8 people But we're changing all of that. It's not a single venture thing (too complex) but we already have super capable founders working on multiple of the pieces and making serious progress.

. @ethboulder2026 is coming [2026]

Ethereum *literally* only needs synchronous cross L2 transactions. If we focus we can have it in a year. If god even grants us one more year. North star, decentralized composability

Open Campus applications are closing on Mar. 28th. Apply if you're a builder who wants to: - become a founder. - build alongside others for 8 weeks. - get access to prev. founders for 1-1 office hours. - have weekly lectures on growth/marketing/etc. - get funding to continue your project. Drop a comment to what you're building — we'll dm you if it's cool. P.s. Like this tweet or tag a talented builder you think would benefit from this. We're trying to help as many people as we can.

Privacy wins. Tornado Cash is legal. Now Roman Storm (@rstormsf) and Alexey Pertsev (@alex_pertsev) should be immediately freed, pardoned, and reimbursed by the state for their invalid prosecution.