BL’S REPLY TO JW’S RESPONSE TO BL’S MOTION FOR COSTS & ATTORNEYS’ FEES RE: 41.7
@blakelively (BL) is still arguing that she is entitled to costs and attorney’s fees under California Civil Code §47.1 after Jed Wallace appealed the district court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction in the defamation suit brought by Wallace & Street Relations, Inc (JW) 🤦🏼🤦🏼
What I find misleading is the way BL frames the statute. Her argument repeatedly isolates phrases like “prevailing defendant,” “successfully defended,” and “in the litigation,” as though merely obtaining a jurisdictional dismissal automatically satisfies §47.1. But that is not what the statute actually says when read as a whole.
The full text provides:
“A prevailing defendant in any defamation action brought against that defendant for making a communication that is privileged under this section shall be entitled to their reasonable attorney’s fees and costs for successfully defending themselves in the litigation…”
The key language BL keeps glossing over is “for making a communication that is privileged under this section.” You cannot read “prevailing defendant” in isolation while severing it from the condition attached to it. The statute does not award fees simply because a defendant obtains a procedural dismissal. It ties fee-shifting to a defendant prevailing on the basis that the communication at issue was privileged under §47.1.
What makes this even more striking is that BL now argues JW “failed to carry their burden to prove malice,” even though the court never reached that issue. The dismissal was based solely on lack of personal jurisdiction, and the court expressly declined to address the remaining grounds. That means there was no judicial finding that the statements were privileged, no ruling on malice, and no merits determination at all. JW, meanwhile, argues that he pleaded malice in detail and that, at the relevant motion stage, those allegations had to be accepted as true. Whether those allegations ultimately succeed is a separate question — but the court never adjudicated them because it stopped at jurisdiction.
BL also argues that, in order to avoid application of the §47.1 privilege, a plaintiff must do more than sufficiently plead malice or avoid a “determination” that the challenged statements were made “without malice” — according to her argument, the plaintiff effectively must win the case. But that framing is odd in itself because the word “determination” does not even appear in §47.1. The statute speaks about privileged communications and prevailing defendants; it does not say that a court must make some affirmative “determination” of no malice before a plaintiff can proceed.
And frankly, how can BL claim she has already “won” when JW has appealed the dismissal itself? The underlying jurisdictional ruling is still being challenged. Calling yourself the “prevailing defendant” while the appeal is pending — especially where there has been no merits ruling at all — is mind-boggling 🤯🤯
That is exactly why JW’s lawyer stated that courts lacking personal jurisdiction “cannot—and do not—determine the merits” and that the court did not determine the claims were “meritless.”
Reading isolated words out of context while omitting the qualifying language of the statute is not persuasive statutory interpretation. It is cherry-picking.
#blakelively #jedwallace #wallacevslively
URL (REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY’S FEES): ⬇️
storage.courtlistener.com/re…