On the appeal of relativism, the idea that there is no "true" knowledge and that evidence doesn't matter in the humanities, including anthropology:
"How did so many scholars, from so many different fields, become so thoroughly convinced of a heady view in epistemology, especially one that is stubbornly rejected by the mainstream of professional philosophers? We cannot say that the appeal is intellectual: We cannot point to powerful arguments that make a strong case for the view. On the contrary, and as we will see in a moment, the intellectual case against relativism about knowledge is overwhelming.
However, while it is not easy to see a strong intellectual case for relativism about knowledge, it is easy to see how it came to seem appealing to scholars who think of their scholarly project as a form of politics. In what way is the view politically appealing?
If any claim to knowledge ā even one coming from established science or direct observation ā depends for its justification on certain contingent non-epistemic values, then any such claim can be dispatched if one rejects the nonepistemic values on which it allegedly depends. And that can seem to be a very powerful tool. Suppose you donāt like what biology is saying about a politically charged topic, e.g., sex. You donāt have to accept what biology has to say, no matter how āwell-supported by the evidenceā it happens to be, since its justification will also depend ineliminably on certain non-epistemic values, ones that you may happen not to share. You donāt like a thesis that evolutionary psychology is building a case for? You may ignore the whole field, dismissing it as deriving from misguided political values. And so on. I
n general, a social constructionism about knowledge provides a blanket a priori guarantee that no one can force you to accept a thesis you donāt like on the alleged grounds that it has been shown to be true by the available evidence. For according to the view in question, there is simply no such thing."