Hmm

🇮🇷🇵🇰🇸🇦🇺🇸 There is a wrinkle in the Persian Gulf theatre of this war: Pakistan, which has a formal military alliance with Saudi Arabia, has deployed combat aircraft to Dhahran/King Abdulaziz airbase, which is situated near Bahrain and along the Persian Gulf coast. I expect Pakistan's role to be limited to air-to-air missions and intercepting Iranian cruise missiles and strike drones. Even so, Iranian planners now have to account for the presence of Pakistani military personnel and aircraft.

🇮🇷 If Iranian commanders and officials are smart, they will try to evacuate everything and anything that can fly to other countries before fighting resumes. This includes civilian airliners, which the Israelis are unlikely to spare, much as they have not to date.

🇮🇷🇶🇦🇺🇸 The LNG carriers in the Persian Gulf are far more lucrative targets for Iran than any oil tanker, bulk carrier, container ship, and so forth. Spare a thought for the crews of the (laden) LNG and LPG carriers if and when these vessels are targeted.

🇮🇷🇶🇦🇺🇸 Should fighting resume, the Qataris will have, in their infinite wisdom, already supplied Iran with high definition footage of the targeted and damaged AN/FPS-132 ballistic missile early warning radar so that Iran can assess the damage and perhaps target it once more.

🇮🇷🇮🇱🇺🇸 If I were in charge "in Tehran," and if I were "certain" that a return to full-scale war was inevitable in the coming days, I would (try to) strike first. An Iran that attempts to strike first may be able to launch one or more salvos before American and Israeli, and perhaps Gulf Arab, combat aircraft return to the skies above Iran (all such aircraft will transit toward Iran at a high subsonic speed). Iran may even catch some American aircraft, among others, on the ground at places including but not limited to Muwaffaq as-Salti airbase in Jordan. As always, Iran's propeller-driven strike drones are much slower than its cruise missiles, let alone its ballistic missiles, so it will be difficult to coordinate "complex strikes" without giving the United States, Israel, and others early warning. Again, if I were in charge "in Tehran," and if I were "certain" that a return to full-scale war was inevitable in the coming days, I would climb up the escalation ladder on the oil and gas front. At this stage of the conflict, it is not enough to merely damage oil and gas infrastructure via harassment/nuisance-level strikes. The damage must be lasting, if not more or less permanent, in the manner that Iran wreaked upon Ras Laffan. Similar things can be said about taking other forms of infrastructure offline, including but not limited to large international airports. It is important to bear in mind that Trump will likely climb the escalation himself so as to bring Iran to heel as soon as possible. There are major first-strike incentives at play for Iranian decision-makers, incentives that are not, of course, without very major and very grave risks. War is ultimately a negotiation through violence. We are well beyond platitudes in this war. It goes without saying that Iran will likely face reciprocal strikes, perhaps from the Gulf Arabs. Such is life, and this war will likely end up being determined by who has the greatest appetite to suffer and sustain losses, not merely inflict violence upon the other. To be determined.

🇮🇷🇺🇸 I don't expect this state of affairs in and around the Persian Gulf to last if fighting resumes, and I would not be surprised if we see some "plausibly deniable" Iranian attacks on shipping, such as attacks via limpet mines, should the ceasefire continue without negotiations taking place, given how Iran will likely prefer not to give the United States more time to prepare to resume full-scale combat operations at a time and place(s) of its choosing.

🇮🇷🇮🇱🇺🇸 On balance, Iran has likely benefited more from the several-day-long ceasefire, which may or may not hold given recent developments/comments by Vance. Access to Iran's underground military bases, including the underground military bases, has likely been at least partially restored; these underground bases have likely been at least partially resupplied; and Iran may well be ready for at least several weeks of "more of the same." Meanwhile, the worldwide oil, natural gas/LNG, urea, fertilizer, heldium, etc., etc., physical supply shortages remain essentially unchanged since the start of the ceasefire, and the prospects for the world economy look bleaker. Following the world economy will likely be the American economy and, with that, Trump's/Republican prospects in the November 2026 midterm, which may well lead to the Democrats controlling Congress, initiating impeachment proceedings against Trump, and so forth. Someone will have to throw in the towel and call it quits. It may end up being Iran. It may well end up being Trump and the United States. To be determined.

🇮🇷🇺🇸 A reminder that the United States is now better-positioned to initiate ground combat operations than it was several weeks ago. American ground combat forces have moved into the region, and Trump may well decide that the United States must escalate so that Iran submits to his terms. Will such a gambit "work?" I doubt it, but desperate times sometimes call for desperate measures, not least when an increasingly desperate leader eager to bring this war to a close will attempt to orchestrate whatever follows.

🇮🇷🇺🇸 Are the two American destroyers in the Persian Gulf or near the Strait of Hormuz? I thought it was a rather reckless, or at least premature, move, even with the understandable imperative of reassuring the shipping industry and markets, so as to restore oil and gas flows. TBD