Strong MFA is necessary. It's no longer sufficient.
The new question isn't "did the user authenticate?"
It's "what exactly did the user authorize, and under what conditions?"
Full breakdown: hubs.ly/Q04jlKBm0#CredentialSecurity#CyberThreats#cybersecurity
Hardware-bound biometrics fix the credential problem:
→ Fingerprint match never leaves the device
→ Domain binding blocks lookalike sites in hardware
→ Proximity check: user within 3 feet
Stop managing credentials. Start proving the human:
hubs.la/Q04jVDLq0
The useful question after Carnival isn't whether your employees have MFA.
It's whether your MFA can be relayed, reset, or socially engineered.
Domain-bound, hardware-bound, biometric FIDO2 closes those paths at the protocol layer.
hubs.la/Q04jd2Jz0#IdentitySecurity
The FBI warned about device code attacks.
The victim used MFA. Authentication succeeded. The attacker still got in.
This isn't credential theft. It's authorization manipulation. The threat model has changed.
hubs.la/Q04jm4wN0#CredentialSecurity#CyberThreats
82% of breaches involve stolen credentials. Your MFA isn't stopping them.
Phishing kits clone domains in minutes. Deepfakes approve push notifications across time zones. If a secret can be known, it can be stolen.
hubs.la/Q04jgy940#NextGenMFA#IdentitySecurity
#MFA authenticates the perimeter. It doesn't protect what's already inside.
That's the real lesson from the Nitrogen ransomware group and the Foxconn incident — and it has nothing to do with malware sophistication.
hubs.la/Q04gppbJ0#CyberThreats#IdentitySecurity
Legacy MFA has one fatal flaw: it assumes enrollment can't be abused remotely. In outsourced environments, that assumption breaks.
When identity can be re-issued over a phone call, attackers don't bypass your controls. They use them. hubs.ly/Q04gd1ll0#PhishingResistant
Ransomware doesn't need to break in anymore. It inherits access.
That's the real lesson from the Nitrogen ransomware group and the Foxconn incident — and it has nothing to do with malware sophistication.
hubs.la/Q04gvRK30#CyberThreats#IdentitySecurity
They're calling your employees, faking IT support, and walking them through OAuth flows until Salesforce issues the token itself.
Auth apps see none of it. Hardware-bound identity does.
hubs.ly/Q04fr-1y0#IdentitySecurity#PhishingResistant
Insurance wasn't breached. Identity was borrowed. Scattered Spider called the help desk. Impersonated an employee. Reset MFA. Got in.
No malware. No exploit. Just a support process that couldn't verify who was asking.
hubs.ly/Q04gcL0R0#PhishingResistant#CyberThreats
Salesforce is the new identity goldmine.
Google. Adidas. Amtrak. Medtronic.They weren't hacked. Their employees were coached into handing over access.
Auth apps confirmed it happened. They didn't stop it.
hubs.ly/Q04fsg4N0#IdentitySecurity#PhishingResistant
CrowdStrike is tracking two new groups running the Scattered Spider playbook across finance, healthcare, and retail.
Their only tool: human judgment under pressure.
That's not a vulnerability you patch. It's one you architect around.
hubs.la/Q04fr9q70#IdentitySecurity
As long as identity can be reassigned over the phone, attackers will make that call.
More training won't fix it. Better monitoring won't fix it.
Remove the attack surface. Don't manage it. Learn more: hubs.la/Q049lhqb0#BiometricAuthentication#IdentitySecurity