Modern wars can fail when leaders put themselves first, says international relations expert lboro.ac.uk//media-centre/pr… via @lborouniPR

The practice of strategy in war is a form of moral economy, according to @tom_waldman (@lborouniversity). Learn more about how narratives play a critical role in regulating the moral strategic field: doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiag042

🚨New issue is out now! 🇺🇳 Is there a future for the UN in the Middle East? 💻 Have technologies revolutionized maritime security? 👀 How does ignorance shape world orders? Read the latest research on these topics and much more, along with 20 book reviews, in our May issue: academic.oup.com/ia/issue/10…

Clausewitz held that war can ‘subserve the ambitions, private interests, and vanity of those in power’. But what are the implications of this for strategy? He left the point hanging and strategic studies has never adequately grappled with the issue of cynical self-interest in war. Yet the problem is everywhere: politicians manipulating war to secure their hold on power; commanders launching operations lacking strategic sense but which advance their careers; war profiteers exploiting conflict to enrich themselves; bureaucratic organisations manoeuvering to protect their interests and command scarce resources… My new #openacess article, published in @IAJournal_CH, is an initial attempt to explore the topic through a new analytical framework bridging military ethics and strategic studies. My main move is to reframe strategy in war as a form of moral economy in which cynical ‘sinful’ and serious ‘saintly’ strategic impulses coexist and interact, thus opening space for explaining how strategy can fail not just due to technical or material reasons but because it loses moral coherence. Based on the analysis I argue that convincing narratives - built on realistic and pragmatic strategies and capable of binding divergent motives to a common purpose - are critical for channelling cynicism in constructive directions and sustaining the moral economy of strategy. Hopefully the piece will spark debate on what I believe is an important understudied issue - and one only underscored by the wars in Ukraine, Gaza and Iran where such strategic corruption and self-serving agendas at all levels and in various spheres appear to have distorted decision-making on and in war. Read the article here: academic.oup.com/ia/article/… #war #strategy #narrative #strategicnarratives #Clausewitz #moraleconomy #militaryethics #militarycontract #strategicstudies #military #newarticle #internationalaffairs #IranWar‌ #ukrainewar

Yep.

📣 New Publication! 📣 Delighted my new #openaccess article on ‘Strategic Saints and Sinners’ is out now in @IAJournal_CH It explores the strategic implications of cynical self-interest in war. Abstract in thread👇 Please share/repost! #strategy #war academic.oup.com/ia/advance-…

On Iran, appears the diplomacy is being handled with as much finesse as the war. What an utter, shameful mess.

"Trump's Wars: How an Anti-War President Learned to Love the Use of Force” "linkedin.com/pulse/trumps-wa…

What Thucydides Could Really Teach Trump “Athens did not fall because it lacked power; power changed Athens” #realism #geopolitics #Thucydides #War #restraint #Pericles #power #strategy #alliances #Trump #narrative #nato #hubris #melos tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.…

This is a superb illustration of what in my book on Clausewitz I called the political ‘web of war’ (amzn.eu/d/0aVqohHa) War’s Gravity nytimes.com/interactive/2026… via @NYTimes

Ugly AI slop. Seriously concerning seeing analysts lazily invoking and debasing #Clausewitz in support of such tendentious positions. The Prussian was a serious scholar who wouldn’t cut corners trying to score partisan social media points in this manner.

Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War is a cautionary tale about the paradoxes of power, and the way the seductions of superiority invite painful reckonings. What Thucydides Could Really Teach Trump: Survival: Vol 68 , No. 1 tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.…