Great to see a solid team like
@3janexyz thinking very differently from the 2022 cohort, where mostly all died the same way: concentrated single-name loans, originator marking its own book, and a thin or correlated loss waterfall (or none at all).
"Real world yield" that was just unsecured trust in a structured-credit costume.
Been spending time on 3Jane's ABF risk work and had a few back-and-forths with the team (s/o
@wumpycrypto &
@uhr3al). It's one of the more solid frameworks I've seen onchain.
And it starts from the failure modes, not the yield (altho yield is pretty juicy as well).
First, let's get into the core insight:
1) Consumer/SMB ABF isn't a credit-quality bet, it's a diversification one.
2) The ~18% gross on the underlying is mostly a complexity premium, not a credit premium.
3) Small borrowers pay it because banks abandoned small-ticket, short-duration lending after 2008, so their real alternative is a 24% card, not an 8% loan.
And the loss math is the part most onchain credit never had.
1) Spread the lending across thousands of tiny borrowers and the random blowups cancel out, go from 30 borrowers to 3,000 and the swing in pool losses drops from ~2% to ~0.2%.
2) The book they lend against loses ~1% to defaults over time; its worst-ever batch lost ~4.5%.
3) Senior holders don't lose a cent until losses hit ~19% of the pool.
4) And even modeled at 2008-level stress, the 1-in-100 bad year only reaches ~19.9%, right at that line.
This is the same kind of paper the bond market already rates investment-grade (think Affirm).
And today, they shipped the first live one. A $10M senior warehouse facility with LendSwift, a US consumer lender:
1) ~15,000 short-duration installment loans, ~16% APR underlying, 15% coupon
2) $3.33M first-loss equity from LendSwift (25% of stack), 75% advance rate
3) sUSD3 junior absorbs next: ~32% APY, ~11%
4) USD3 senior paid first: ~13.1% APY, ~64%, behind ~36% of the stack
5) blended ~16% net APY to suppliers, 12mo revolving / 6mo amortization
Two structural pieces seal it.
1) The loans sit in an SPV bankruptcy-remote from LendSwift's corporate entity. Lender blows up, collateral's still walled off and yours.
2) And repayments are swept into a DACA-controlled account, not the originator's. The structural control against diverting or commingling collections, one of the cleaner failure points in off-chain credit.
This is what real-world yield onchain should actually look like.
Not a wrapped T-bill.
Cryptonative dollars funding real US consumer credit through real securitization plumbing.
Compressing the bank-warehouse => forward-flow => ABS gauntlet into one programmable conduit.
Pretty sick.
Still a few things I want to work through with them, and will. But structurally, this is the most serious onchain credit I've seen in a while.
Crypto private credit never had a yield problem. It had a structure problem. Someone's finally building it.