Bitcoin proved that scarcity could be a fact instead of a promise, Zcash proved that privacy could be something you hold rather than something you ask for
01 is a coin that is genuinely scarce, a coin you can hold unseen, a coin you can borrow against
Quick heads up, some of you couldn't buy 01 from certain wallets because of bugs in the frontend trading flow
We tracked those down and fixed them. If a buy failed for you over the past hours, it should go through now
Thanks to everyone who flagged it
On what's next: we're moving forward with USD0 testing on testnet, and we're waiting on an independent audit before it goes anywhere near mainne
Everything in 01 is built to be tested in the open and checked by anyone, and an external review is the step we're taking before USD0
Stablecoins pay the issuer and watch you, USD0 flips both
A dollar you can hold and move privately, redeemable 1:1 for USDS, that pays the yield to you instead of a company
Here is the design, and where it actually stands
Straight about the stage, because you should trust what you can check
USD0 is a design with a working testnet build of the anchor and the vault. The privacy circuits and an external audit are the next steps, and we will show our work
That is the bet: a dollar that is private, redeemable, and yield-bearing, with the dangerous part designed out instead of papered over
Built in the open, shipped in stages, every claim checkable
zero1.cash/blog/usd0
99,361 01 have been burned so far, a bit under 1% of supply
Every buy and every sell burns 0.25
You do not have to trust that figure. The curve's minted is the gross supply; the token's totalSupply is what still exists. The gap is the burn
cast call 0x6C1A...f572 "minted()(uint256)"
cast call 0x3270...a4cA "totalSupply()(uint256)"
Subtract the second from the first: that is the burn, on chain, right now
"Why is the hasher not verified on Etherscan?"
The PoseidonT3 hasher is generated bytecode, not Solidity, so there is nothing to source-verify
You confirm it by reproducing the bytecode and matching the hash
zero1.cash/blog/verify-the-h…
"Could someone hold a setup secret and quietly drain the shielded pool?"
The right question to as: the answer is no, and you don't have to trust us for it
The verifier was built from the public Perpetual Powers of Tau:
zero1.cash/blog/verify-the-t…
540,115 of 01 now sits in the shielded pool: 6.2% of circulating supply, held in private
That number is the crowd you hide in, and it only matters as it grows
We ust sent 100 tokens through 01's shielded pool. The transaction is public, you can open it right now, and you still cannot find the number 100 anywhere in it, or who we sent it to
Here is exactly how that works, field by field
etherscan.io/tx/0x126a1a00e8…
The biggest leak is not in the proof, it is who submits the transaction
If you send it from your own wallet, your address is attached to the action
That is why you use a relayer, so a neutral address posts it for you. In this tx, a relayer did.
That is the whole design, and none of it asks for your trust
Make the transaction, read every field, and confirm for yourself that the amount and the recipient are nowhere in it
zero1.cash