Online several years ago, there was a series of drawn out blog posts, arguments, and conference presentations dueling out the competing merits of panpsychism and eliminative materialism.
The crux was that if you follow the philosophy of mind down to its core, you’re left either with a view of mind as ubiquitous and constitutively basic (we have it because it’s in the nature of things to have it) or a view of mind as entirely epiphenomenal (we don’t have it because nothing, in the final analysis, does; we have only the illusion of the thing to explain, not its actual existence, because it doesn’t actually exist in the same way that firing neurons exist).
There are variations of both approaches, but this is where the hard problem of consciousness, on these views, has landed us. The problem, stated roughly, is how do physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective, first-person experiences? Moving in the other direction, we could add: Why is our phenomenal experience completely opaque to the physical processes that give rise to it?
The panpsychist resolves the problem by treating phenomenal experience as basic. To be a thing is to have a view on other things; stated differently, causal encounters just are perceptual encounters, of some kind. The problem on this view is how simpler causal–perceptual interactions give rise to complex ones.
The eliminative materialist argues that the hard problem dissolves once we accept that our phenomenal experience is simply caused by non-phenomenal physical events taking place in the brain. Phenomenal experience does not itself do any causal work. The problem here is where to place these phenomenal states in the broader scheme of things, once properly understood.
I was always struck by this all-or-nothing setup.
It’s one of those results that should give you pause. How many other problems are like this? Well, it turns out, quite a few: questions about purpose, value, meaning, and intentionality all tend to follow the same basic bifurcation.
The thing is either really there in the causal bones of things and our human first-person experience really is picking that up in a veridical way, or the thing is an artifact of something else—maybe it’s a buggy inference made by a creature not designed to pick out the truth, or perhaps it’s a useful misdirection that still helps you get around the environment.
The hard problem of consciousness is, in this way, actually the hard problem of causality.
And this all has something to do with AI, doesn’t it? One might predict that it’s the panpsychist who is more likely to attribute human-like qualities to an AI. But actually I think we’re seeing the opposite is the case.
It’s the eliminationists who are more likely to draw close parallels between humans and AIs, not because they are drawing the AI closer to the human in any phenomenal sense but because they already see the human as AI-like, owing to how they answer the hard problem of causality.
There is a misattribution here, but it’s not the one eliminationists are keen to diagnose.
More to say. Just some quick notes.