🚨 LEAKED: The MoD’s £240m Secret Deal with Palantir 🚨
Over the Christmas recess, while Parliament and the press were looking the other way, a document was signed that commits £240 million of UK public money to a single American technology company.
The contract between the Ministry of Defence and Palantir Technologies UK Ltd—administered through Defence Digital at MoD Corsham—runs from 2026 to 2029. It embeds Palantir’s software and personnel deep into the digital and intelligence infrastructure of the UK military.
But unless you had seen the leaked contract yourself, you would know nothing about it. Because that is exactly how the MoD and Palantir want it. Here is what they are hiding:
The Art of the No-Tender Deal In standard public procurement, competitive tendering ensures the taxpayer gets value for money. It prevents cronyism and ensures the best provider wins the contract. Palantir’s £240m contract had no competitive tender.
Worse, it was signed on 30 December—a date synonymous with "taking out the trash" in political circles, when scrutiny is at its lowest. The contract number itself is classified.
The Section 43 Shield If you were to file a Freedom of Information (FOIA) request for this contract, you would hit a brick wall. The pricing section, the Intellectual Property (IP) clause, the liability figures, and all the contract schedules are heavily redacted under Section 43 of the FOIA—commercial interests.
But Section 43 is a qualified exemption. This means the MoD must apply a public interest test. They must prove that keeping Palantir's commercial interests secret outweighs the public's right to know how their money is spent.
In the case of a no-tender, nine-figure contract awarded without competition, this argument is legally flimsy. You cannot claim that revealing the price will distort future competitive bidding when you didn't allow a competitive bid in the first place. The public interest in scrutinizing a monopolistic contract of this scale vastly outweighs Palantir's commercial preferences.
"Should" vs. "Must": A Sovereign Security Risk Palantir is not just any tech company. It was founded by Peter Thiel, grew out of a CIA seed investment, and its largest shareholder base is American. Its founders have had direct relationships with US intelligence for two decades.
Yet, the contract states that Palantir staff working on classified MoD sites "should" hold Security Check clearance as a minimum, with Developed Vetting available when required. Personnel "should" be UK nationals where site classification requires.
Should. Not Must.
In contract law, "should" is a preference. "Must" is a mandate. Allowing a US-linked intelligence company to operate in the nerve centre of the UK’s defence digital infrastructure under a soft "preference" for UK nationals is a staggering loophole.
The Condition 14 Gag Why hasn't Palantir UK defended this deal? Why the corporate silence?
Because of Condition 14. The contract explicitly prohibits Palantir from communicating with the press, television, radio, or any other media about anything in the contract without prior written MoD consent.
They are legally barred from speaking. The contractor is gagged, the price is hidden, and Parliament was in recess.
What Happens Next? This is not just a story about one contract. It is a warning about the quiet privatization of critical state infrastructure, the erosion of sovereign data ownership, and the deliberate evasion of democratic scrutiny.
An internal review of the FOIA redactions must be filed. But more importantly, Parliament must act. The Public Accounts Committee and the Defence Select Committee have the power to summon MoD officials and Palantir executives to answer for this.
£240 million of public money. Zero scrutiny. It’s time to turn the lights on.