I agree with
@kylascan that it doesn’t have to be this way. But respectfully, I have some disagreements with
@brianJshearer’s paper.
What is the right way to regulate insurance, especially a broken system like California? (Warning: Long, detailed, technical post ahead.)
Brian Shearer’s paper raises critical issues at the heart of California’s insurance crisis and what is the right way to regulate insurance. But I respectfully disagree with Brian on some key points, which I explain below. Tagging
@Dschwarcz, who has advised and consulted with me on policy, although what follows (most notably any errors) is my own work.
I found two notable errors/omissions that pertain to important issues in California’s insurance market, specifically: (1) claiming the FAIR Plan’s financial position was not due to inadequate pricing; and (2) not addressing recent research that rebuts the contention that Proposition 103 provided Californians substantial savings on auto insurance since inception.
(1) Start with the FAIR Plan. Brian seems to claim the FAIR Plan would have been solvent in 2025 if the participating insurance companies had not made any distributions and kept all capital in place. He makes the case purely with words, but this is a quantitative claim so we need to run through some numbers.
The FAIR Plan assessed the insurance companies $1 billion, and even after that capital infusion the FAIR Plan had a deficit of $352 million. Can we plausibly have made up at least $1 billion or maybe $1.35 billion by retaining all distributions and investing those retained distributions?
From 1995 (the last year there was a capital INFUSION) to 2025, there were cumulative distributions of $227 million. I created a spreadsheet to model out returns of 5%, 6% or 7% per year. Of course you can assume any return you want. The bottom line: no, you can’t reach even $1 billion of extra capital through retaining all distributions and investing at plausible rates of return. (Remember, you don’t want to invest in assets that are too risky!)
Check my work and your mileage may vary with different assumptions. But the larger point is you can’t make a mathematical argument without rubbing some numbers together in a useful way.
(2) A key argument Brian makes is that, as he writes, “the evidence shows that rate regulation leads to cheaper rates without countervailing loss in access.” Here in California, we have had robust rate regulation and we have a crisis of access, so that’s a bold claim to make right now.
Brian’s key evidence to bolster this claim, which he cites over and over, is a 2019 analysis by Hunter and Heller from the Consumer Federation of America about the results of auto insurance regulation. They claim that more rigid regulation leads to greater savings. And the key state for this claim is California after Proposition 103.
It is surprising that Brian repeatedly cites this paper without even mentioning – let alone considering – the more recent 2024 paper by Powell, Lehmann and Adams, published in the prestigious and peer reviewed Connecticut Law Journal (Volume 31, Number 1, 2024-2025).
In this paper, the authors present strong evidence that Proposition 103 did NOT lead to lower auto rates for Californians. A (very) brief summary of their argument is as follows:
(a) CA auto insurance rates started in 1989 at a very high level due to a 1979 CA Supreme Court ruling that expanded liability – thereby raising cost
(b) This ruling was overruled in 1988, the same year Proposition 103 passed, which contracted liability and thereby lowered cost
(c) Freezing auto insurance rates after Proposition 103 passed did not lead to lower prices; it was lower costs that allowed prices not to rise – and the authors even claim that prices should have fallen instead of stayed flat
(d) The lower rate of increase for auto insurance in California from 1989 is due to starting at a higher level with a subsequent positive supply side shock, not due to the passage of Proposition 103.
To be sure, one can certainly take issue with this analysis. Maybe it is incorrect. But you can’t just ignore it!
Standing back, I believe Brian does not grapple with the key argument for having more market based pricing rather than more regulatory based pricing in P&C. Nobody should dispute that we need robust regulation in P&C insurance! Smart regulation makes the market much more efficient, transparent and fair.
However, in my opinion, Brian does not meaningfully engage with the core issue of why we would want more market based pricing in P&C insurance. Although we certainly want to avoid excess profits or elevated selling costs, I believe there are (at least) two key reasons we want regulations to harness, rather than control, market pricing in P&C insurance.
Reason #1 is having insurance companies compete to price risk can lead to more accurate price signals. And those price signals are incredibly valuable for identifying and quantifying risk. In other words, the value of P&C insurance to society is not just the insurance itself; it is also the price signals the insurance generates.
Reason #2 is having insurance companies compete to lower risk locally can both align incentives and identify technology to reduce risk society-wide. In other words, competition in P&C insurance can lead not just to more accurate price signals but also innovation that improves social welfare.
To be clear, none of this is easy or automatic. Insurance regulation is a complicated topic and there is lots of room for principled disagreement. I enjoyed reading Brian’s paper and I think it makes a useful contribution.
Doesn't have to be this way!